> So by condemning particular kinds of slavery, you mean to say in those cases it is sensible to pressure another society to change that aspect, despite wide-re

> So by condemning particular kinds of slavery, you mean to say in those cases it is sensible to pressure another society to change that aspect, despite wide-reaching socioeconomic consequences and the consequential "badness" caused by this disruption. Right? That is, this is where you'd consider drawing the line? I have trouble imagining such cases which are not effectively intergroup disputes. There seems to be a fundamental difference between enslaving one's own people and enslaving "the other." if there is even a significant portion of one's own people, then protections for slaves become political. If it is fully of another group, then you have an inter-group dispute and that's properly settled between groups. > I think it's reasonable to say it works on a more fundamental level than economic racial or even gender discrimination -- it's not "you're not getting that job because you're black/a woman", it's essentially "you may not be -- or at least not openly be -- what you are". Now you have a problem, which is that identity is complicated and socially constrained. As Michel Foucault pointed out, up until relatively modern times, sexuality wasn't really a point of identity. That leads to the problem of who gets to decide what these constructs of identity are? It seems to me the more fundamental issue is that a concept of heterosexual identity is dependent on an opposition to a concept of homosexual identity and so cultures may accept both as valid identities or simply eschew the whole concept of identification with sexuality completely. It's tempting to look at the latter as homophobic but I am not sure it is more homophobic than the former, for if people identifying as homosexual are insisted to be perpetually a small minority, then they are necessarily "othered" by the distinction.