4 ms·
Ubuntu scores highest in UK Gov security assessment
- theboywho 13y agoThis raises a lot of questions about Ubuntu if a government that wants to tap everything has no problem and is "indirectly" recommending it for security.
- jlgaddis 13y agoIt was apparently written by a Canonical employee, FWIW.
- theboywho 13y agoThe article was written by a Canonical employee but not the study. If I were Canonical I would avoid writing/publishing such an article, as anything that the government recommends for security is probably seen by many as potentially backdoored.
- tych0 13y agoDon't be ridiculous. Most crypto algorithms that back major standards today have been approved by the NSA, and to date no backdoors have been found. For example, the change to NSA suggested for DES s-boxes _strengthened_ the standard. [Disclaimer: I am a Canonical employee, but I had nothing to do with this.]
- 6d0debc071 13y agoThe A5/1-encryption standard was artificially weakened - short key length with padding of zeros - to make mobile phones easier to eavesdrop on. http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Sources-We-were-pressured-to-weaken-the-mobile-security-in-the-80s-7413285.html http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Sources-We-were-pres... Given their past behaviour with respect to weakening security, why ought someone to trust them now?
- free652 13y agoI don't see where it says NSA weakened the GSM standard in Europe?
- 6d0debc071 13y agoIt doesn't. If you want NSA stuff, here you go: http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/5/5263/1.html http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/5/5263/1.html Short version: ADVAPI.DLL contains - or contained - keys, one controls the implementation of crypto to help with US export regs. The NSA looks highly likely to own the second key (MS devs failed to remove the debugging information in NT4 Service Pack 5 and it was labelled as 'NSAKEY'.) The third key was supposedly a surprise to the MS folks. # That said, I'm not sure why you'd want me to respond along those lines given that we're talking about a UK Gov report.
- tych0 13y agoADVAPI.DLL is a microsoft thing. It's not a crypto standards thing, so my point still stands. (Restated: it is easier to attack implementations than standards.)
- moomin 13y agoI think you might need to distinguish between the old, secretive, possibly creepy NSA and the current slurp the world volcano lair NSA.
- rakoo 13y agoI believe the CESG has done this study to see how other goverment and industrial branches can least be tapped, not to see how it can best tap everyon.
- baxter001 13y agoSystems under test were: - Android 4.2 - iOS 6 - OSX 10.8 - Blackberry 10.1 - Google Chrome OS 26 - Ubuntu 12.04 - Windows 7 and 8 - Windows 8 RT - Windows Phone So pretty much a statement that a modern open linux can be made the most secure.
- profquail 13y ago> So pretty much a statement that a modern open linux can be made the most secure. Why didn't they test any other Linux distributions besides Ubuntu (and Android, if you want to include that)? I also wonder why, if they were really interested in conducting a thorough test, they didn't include any of the BSDs (e.g., FreeBSD, OpenBSD).
- csmithuk 13y agoIf its the government, there is no *BSD experience anywhere. I doubt they'd recommend it. Everything is purchased based on the ability to fill the purchaser's pocket on the side. Yes I have witnessed this - I did contract work for NHS and one of the PCTs had taken on a vendor for a cash back promise.
- jlgaddis 13y agoDiscussion from five days ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7130479 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7130479 Also, apparently about mobile phone operating systems and written by a Canonical employee.
- infosecslave 13y agoThis is seriously lacking data. What exactly is this "Malicious Code Detection and Prevention" on Ubuntu? Or perhaps Application sandboxing?
- ronaldx 13y agoWarning as potentially misleading: despite the large CESG logo, this is hosted at ubuntu.com. The PDF summary is written by a Sales Engineer at Canonical Ltd. The original CESG security guidance has a rather different perspective: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/end-user-devices-security-guidance--2 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/end-user-devices-s...
- StavrosK 13y agoCare to summarize? Each OS is a different document.
- baxter001 13y agoThere's not going to be any one line answers but the section https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/end-user-devices-security-guidance-ubuntu-1204/end-user-devices-security-guidance-ubuntu-1204#significant-risks https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/end-user-devices-... is illuminating. Not least for recommending the use of TPMs for disk encryption
- eliasmacpherson 13y agoMaybe I am a crank but I distrust TPM.
- pgeorgi 13y agoSince they're so slow, they're typically only used as "safe" data storage for keys, with all crypto happening in the CPU. The main appeal of a TPM is then that data stored inside it is "sealed" (bound) to a defined system state (which only protects against the most crude attacks, but still) and somewhat protected from access. You could just store a password encrypted key in there, like the one created for regular disk crypto. Worst case (TPM fully broken) it's as good as a no-TPM setup. In all other cases, the TPM provides another line of defense.
- 13y ago
- philliphaydon 13y agoWait what? Secure Boot can be turned off by anyway can it not? It's just it's on by default... > Ubuntu’s response, from Ubuntu 12.10 onwards is to adopt Grub2 as the default bootloader, with support for Secure Boot, but with anability to turn off secure boot to modify the OS, if required. This is explained in John Melamut’s blog post here [13]. We believe thisgives users and enterprises the best compromise between security and ability to customise after sale.
- pgeorgi 13y agoOn x86, Microsoft caved in and mandated (in Windows 8 Logo Requirements) that it must be possible to deactivate Secure Boot. My guess is that they were more concerned with Windows 7 using customers or hardware vendors that didn't want to build two lines of devices, one Windows 7, one Windows 8. On ARM, the Secure Boot rules are unchanged: mandantory, must not be deactivated. I somewhat expect Microsoft to switch the x86 side requirements back after Windows 7 support ends. Since this part of the behaviour isn't specified in UEFI specs but only in Windows Logo requirements, there's also exactly 0 leverage other market participants have over what's going on in that part of the PC platform, except maybe antitrust complaints - that easily take 5-10 years before there are any consequences.