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I really don't understand the all or nothing argument. Can you genuinely not envision a situation in which we would need secrecy for at least a time? If for no
by Loughla 13y ago
I really don't understand the all or nothing argument.
Can you genuinely not envision a situation in which we would need secrecy for at least a time? If for nothing else, to protect the people who are looking out for our interests overseas? Like it or not, covert operations and intelligence is important to the long-term operations of a sufficiently large entity. How else will we know what our enemies are planning?
I would argue that your view of 'no secrets at all' is just as ridiculous as the government's current approach to our data. It's incredibly naive and comes across as sophomore-level debate. Saying that we can have no secrets is giving up embedded operatives dealing with people who genuinely have bad intentions. Saying that we can have no secrets would have dramatically changed the outcome of the landings at Normandy and WWII in general.
That black and white style of argument is ridiculous; that's what I'm saying.
- jimktrains2 13y ago> If for nothing else, to protect the people who are looking out for our interests overseas? Like it or not, covert operations and intelligence is important to the long-term operations of a sufficiently large entity. Just because that's the way things have always been done, does that make it a requirement? Why do we need to spy on others? Why do we need to launch covert attacks on others? > Saying that we can have no secrets is giving up embedded operatives dealing with people who genuinely have bad intentions. Yes, I understand that. > Saying that we can have no secrets would have dramatically changed the outcome of the landings at Normandy and WWII in general. Did it really? I mean, none of that was do to the Axis powers pretty much dropping the ball and fighting a battle on two fronts and a Führer who didn't listen to his generals (yes, partially because he believed the disinformation we fed)? I'm not saying that secrecy wasn't important to how D-Day was done or Operation Fortitude (the deception operation done before Neptune). We did, however, loose heavy casualties in it and the Germans couldn't move their equipment fast enough to combat us for reasons I said earlier. It wasn't simply that we kept it a secret and it went off without a hitch. > That black and white style of argument is ridiculous; that's what I'm saying. I agree, however, defining that gray is extremely tough. We have attempted to define it in a very narrow context, and look what we're dealing with now. Absolutes are ridiculous, abuse of power because grey is hard to define, though, is bad as well. Which is worse? A government unable to take secretive (hostile) action against other states (or it's own citizens), or one in which we have mass surveillance, secret (kangaroo courts), torture, and secret executions of people not deemed by a public court to be a threat?
- aaronem 13y ago> Which is worse? A government unable to take secretive (hostile) action against other states (or it's own citizens), or one in which we have mass surveillance, secret (kangaroo courts), torture, and secret executions of people not deemed by a public court to be a threat? Which is worse? A bullet in the head, or a malignant, metastatic, but slow-growing cancer? Neither is good, you understand, but if I'm forced to choose between them, I'll pick the more survivable one every time.
- the_af 13y agoI guess you're saying not being able to conduct covert action against other states (and your own citizens) is like taking a bullet to the head, in that it's fast and offers no hope, while the increase of mass surveillance is like a slow-growing cancer that you can hopefully survive. I think they are both like slow-growing cancers, and that both can be survived. Maybe overt actions are enough. I don't think the situation today is similar to WWII.
- aaronem 13y agoCertainly the situation today isn't similar to World War II. But that's not the only sort of situation in which covert intelligence is of value; how better, after all, to know what overt action to take?
- lostlogin 13y agoThere was a raging argument in German high command about the best way to combat allied landing. The key sticking point was whether extremely forward placement of troops (and tanks) was better than rear placement where initial sea bombardment could be avoided. The air supremacy enjoyed by the allies made rear placement tricky, as movement of troops was limited during daylight. Neither option was great. Rommel lost out and many troops were held in reserve back from the coast. However he was further hamstrung by Hitler keeping key units in reserve after the initial landings as he feared a second landing at the Pas de Calais. Had there been certainty about the landings, reserves could have been appropriately placed ahead of time and the Atlantic wall further bolstered (it was build pretty damn fast anyway). The bad whether at the time hampered landing of equipment and supplies and a big German push could have been very effective. Secrecy and deception were key parts of the plan and contributed in a big way to keeping decent numbers of German troops away (operation Mince Meat is fascinating - a dead man made a very significant impact on allied success http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mincemeat http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mincemeat). While having 2 fronts was a problem for the Germans, the western front wasn't the problematic part. The war was lost on the eastern front. Not the best source, but it is a short answer that in congruous with other stuff I have read. http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_many_of_the_German_casualties_were_on_the_Eastern_Front http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_many_of_the_German_casualties_...