3 ms·
Well, the underlying issue is quite real -- TrueCrypt's hidden volume capability is so well-known that it provides little to no practical benefit. Look at it t
by deong 13y ago
Well, the underlying issue is quite real -- TrueCrypt's hidden volume capability is so well-known that it provides little to no practical benefit.
Look at it this way, if the US government could get Glenn Greenwald's laptop, which in this scenario is TrueCrypt-encrypted, do you think they would simply give it back to him and say, "I guess he didn't have anything after all" if the first password he gave them turned up nothing but pictures of his cat?
Of course, the goal of TrueCrypt may be to provide a small amount of extra security, which it does. As others have said, a regime that would torture you to death likely doesn't need your laptop anyway. But the point is reasonably valid that a hidden volume is only enormously valuable if no one thinks you might have it, which isn't the case with TrueCrypt anymore.
- ensignavenger 13y agoIf Greenwald were trying to hide what he has, he could put the documents/information he has already leaked, plus a bunch of stuff he decided not to, plus some other documents that are undecided and innocuous in an unhidden (encrypted) partition- or have a second hidden partition- that he could give the Feds access to very reluctantly and such, and they would find all those documents and possibly think that was all he had. They still would not know what else he had, and really wouldn't know that he had anymore, even if they suspected it.