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Schneier has previously written about TrueCrypt, which has a cryptographically protected version of this defense (it creates a deniable hidden partition within
by mbrubeck 17y ago
Schneier has previously written about TrueCrypt, which has a cryptographically protected version of this defense (it creates a deniable hidden partition within the free space of another encrypted partition): http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/truecrypts_deni.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/truecrypts_den...
Obviously there are many other ways to simply hide your data from customs (e.g. put it on a microSD card and physically hide it). But the solution in this article has the interesting property that "it also allows you to deny a customs official your data without having to lie or pretend" which might be nice if, say, you want to publish it in the IT manual for your public corporation.
- imajes 17y agoBut that's false: if you can't reveal the contents of your hard drive, you'll have to explain that it's encrypted with a key you don't have on you. The question will then be asked "so where's the key?" and you'll have to explain that a confidante has it. When you decline to reveal who that is, you are then having to lie. If you choose not to reveal it's with a confidante, you are then also pretending. Remember, cops are supposed to be good at the asking questions and human behavior stuff. Less good at detecting when something's been altered technologically.
- radu_floricica 17y agoNope. The article mentions that it's better to give the key to somebody "you have a privileged relationship with", such as a spouse or a lawyer. Then you can even tell the customs officials who has the key - the catch is that the process of getting the key (legally) out of the person who has it is between hard and impossible. Sure, you could call that person and ask him to email the key without saying you're still in customs - but that is something they cannot tell you to do.