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agreed. email i just sent to Scheiner: Bruce, I like what you came up with - but it has a really large problem in that, if you are stopped and compelled to sh
by imajes 17y ago
agreed. email i just sent to Scheiner:
Bruce,
I like what you came up with - but it has a really large problem in that, if you are stopped and compelled to show your computer, you would become a combatant by refusing to share information. You would immediately be seen as a risk, get arrested, and then compelled to give up the name of an accomplice. However, as you know, most of this is just theater- since you have nothing to hide, the only real problem is the "in plain sight" provisions that could get you in trouble for having a couple of downloaded movies on your desktop.
So how about this?
Get a larger than required laptop disk, and partition it, with one size being a tradtional, smaller size. 250 or 120GB perhaps.
On the larger partition, stick your fave OS, work etc.
On the smaller, put a plain win xp install, with some fake data and so on. Outlook with generated emails that look reasonably fresh and so forth.
Then, have a boot loader that can be configured to autoboot to either system unless a special key combination is entered on system start.
This way, once you're done with your flight, you can encrypt your partition and reboot into your "clean" system. Then, if you get stopped, you can happily show the system. At that point, there really would not be any evidence for any further search, so you would not easily be detained. You could also go further by ensuring your clean system didn't see the other partition, and that you had a sticker showing the hard drive size being the same as the smaller partition.
Ghost Drives.
simpler and safer than having to risk your machine.
- mbrubeck 17y agoSchneier has previously written about TrueCrypt, which has a cryptographically protected version of this defense (it creates a deniable hidden partition within the free space of another encrypted partition): http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/truecrypts_deni.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/truecrypts_den... Obviously there are many other ways to simply hide your data from customs (e.g. put it on a microSD card and physically hide it). But the solution in this article has the interesting property that "it also allows you to deny a customs official your data without having to lie or pretend" which might be nice if, say, you want to publish it in the IT manual for your public corporation.
- imajes 17y agoBut that's false: if you can't reveal the contents of your hard drive, you'll have to explain that it's encrypted with a key you don't have on you. The question will then be asked "so where's the key?" and you'll have to explain that a confidante has it. When you decline to reveal who that is, you are then having to lie. If you choose not to reveal it's with a confidante, you are then also pretending. Remember, cops are supposed to be good at the asking questions and human behavior stuff. Less good at detecting when something's been altered technologically.
- radu_floricica 17y agoNope. The article mentions that it's better to give the key to somebody "you have a privileged relationship with", such as a spouse or a lawyer. Then you can even tell the customs officials who has the key - the catch is that the process of getting the key (legally) out of the person who has it is between hard and impossible. Sure, you could call that person and ask him to email the key without saying you're still in customs - but that is something they cannot tell you to do.
- pmorici 17y agoThere is no point in altering the laptop hard drives sticker. If they have gone through the trouble of opening the hatch to see that they are likely going to just remove the drive and hook it up to their equipment at which point it's going to be obvious there's more than meets the eye.
- imajes 17y agodoubt it. given that new macs can show the harddrive with the simple removal of a panel, i can see lots of "front line" cops try and make sure 1+1 = 2. Would have to go to a lab to prove that it'd been partitioned, and that costs money and requires warrants.