4 ms·
I don't think the rural telephone surcharge is a necessary component of common carrier. For example railroads are all common carriers and they are under no duty
by snowwrestler 13y ago
I don't think the rural telephone surcharge is a necessary component of common carrier. For example railroads are all common carriers and they are under no duty to run rail lines to every single community in the U.S.
My understanding of common carrier is that is simply mandates that the provider must publish a single public rate card with objective criteria for the rates, and then charge everyone equally by those criteria. It's to prevent UPS (which I believe is regulated as a common carrier) from taking extra money from Amazon to slow down or lose shipments from Walmart.
- rayiner 13y agoThe relevant sense of "common carrier" in this context is as a classification in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It's a detailed set of regulations applicable to telephone companies. Classifying ISPs as "common carriers" would not just implicate all of those regulations, but implicate one of the animating principles of phone service under the Telecom Act of 1996, which is universal service. "Common carrier" is also a classification for various services under common law, but that's not what the recent D.C. Circuit opinion was about. Those involve not formal regulations, but certain rights and liabilities under common law, which differ depending on the particular kind of service.
- dragonwriter 13y ago> The relevant sense of "common carrier" in this context is as a classification in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It's a detailed set of regulations applicable to telephone companies. Classifying ISPs as "common carriers" would not just implicate all of those regulations, but implicate one of the animating principles of phone service under the Telecom Act of 1996, which is universal service. You are conflating two related but distinct issues, and then compounding that by badly confusing the issue of universal service. Of the conflated issues: First, is requirements that define a common carrier, which the FCC can apply to entities designated as "telecommunications providers" under the Telecommunications Act but cannot apply to entities designated as "information service providers" under the Act, per the DC Circuit ruling recently, those requirements include things like the non-discrimination/non-blocking rules in the recent Open Internet Order. Designating a new category of "telecommunications service providers" (provided such designation survives any challenge -- there are definitions of what consistutes telecommunication service in the Act and the FCC would have to have reasonable grounds for this designation) allows the FCC to apply provisions that are essentially common carrier rules to entities in the newly defined category. Second, is the particular regulations that the FCC has applied to particular classes of telecommunications providers, such as landline telephone providers. Designating a new class of telecommunications service providers would not automatically apply any existing regulations that the FCC has adopted for previously-defined classes of telecommunications providers to the newly identifed class. Finally, universal service is not an "animating principle of phone service under the Telecom Act of 1996". Universal service was adopted for phone service in the Communications Act of 1934. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was notable in expanding the role of universal service to include "advanced telecommunication and information services". This expressly includes non-common carrier "information services" as well as common carrier "telecommunication services", so it is completely irrelevant tot he common carrier issue. > "Common carrier" is also a classification for various services under common law, but that's not what the recent D.C. Circuit opinion was about. Actually, applying the common law definition of "common carrier" to the particular regulations that the FCC adopted in the Open Internet Order to see if they conflicted with the Telecommunication Act's provision that common carrier rules could be applied only to "telecommunication service" providers and not "information service" providers (given the FCC's designation of ISPs as the latter rather than the former) was central to the DC Circuit decision.
- rayiner 13y agoI'm not really sure what distinction you're trying to create with the term "telecommunications service provider" versus "telecommunications provider" and "information service." The term "telecommunications service provider" doesn't appear at all in the D.C. Circuit's opinion. Moreover, the phrase "common carrier" is more or less coextensive with Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1934, which creates a heavy regulatory oversight regime. I'm not sure how the FCC could classify ISPs as common carriers and not bring them under the purview of Title II. While Universal Service was not created in the 1996 Act, it is definitely an animating principle of the Act, because the Act expands the program. However, it doesn't go so far as to extend it to ISPs. Universal service contributions aren't totally coextensive with telecommunications provider versus information service classification, but are almost so. Anyone that provides something similar to voice telephone service (including cellular and VOIP), contributes, but internet providers do not. I don't mention universal service to confuse the issue. I mention it as an example of the heavily-political, expensive, misconceived sort of program that becomes fair game when you bring internet service into the world of common carriers. The world of telecom has many different regimes. Not just from a legal standpoint, but from a philosophical and political standpoint. Phone service is considered crucial public infrastructure. It is subject to Title II. It is subject to USF. It is subject to extensive FCC oversight. It is the subject of political bellyaching about how people in rural America are entitled to have their high-cost service subsidized by everyone else. That's one regime. The other is internet and cable service. This is a land of ponies and cupcakes. Once you reclassify internet services as common carriers, you put internet service in a whole different bucket, not just legally, but philosophically and politically. And you don't want internet service in the same bucket as phone service. It's an awful place, full of people who think that companies shouldn't spend money building gigabit in New York when people in rural Alabama still have 256 kbps DSL. Your point about the common law definition of common carrier is well-taken. It isn't irrelevant, because the D.C. Circuit did look to it in its opinion. However, it's indirectly relevant. If you start at the last paragraph of page 45 of the opinion: http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/3AF8B4D938CDEEA685257C6000532062/$file/11-1355-1474943.pdf http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/3AF8B4D93... you can see that the court is interpreting the statutory definition of "common carrier." Specifically the phrase: "A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(51). "Common carrier under this Act" essentially refers to Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1934. On page 47, the court notes that: "Offering little guidance as to the meaning of the term 'common carrier,' the Communications Act defines that phrase, somewhat circularly, as 'any person engaged as a common carrier for hire.' 47 U.S.C. § 153(11). Courts and the Commission have therefore resorted to the common law to come up with a satisfactory definition." In other words, there are two definitions of "common carrier," one in the statute and one at common law, and because the one in the statute is underdefined, the court looks to the common law definition. But they are still separate definitions. 'snowwrestler said: "I don't think the rural telephone surcharge is a necessary component of common carrier. For example railroads are all common carriers and they are under no duty to run rail lines to every single community in the U.S." The fact that the D.C. Circuit looked to the common law definition of "common carrier" to elucidate the statutory definition does not mean that the statutory definition cannot carry an independent set of obligations, different from the common law definition. Clear as mud?