3 ms·
I would be surprised if they didn't simply have them installed in all machines and only have them activated in 100,000 devices overseas. Logistically seems sim
by kingkawn 13y ago
I would be surprised if they didn't simply have them installed in all machines and only have them activated in 100,000 devices overseas. Logistically seems simpler to coordinate if component-cost is a non-issue for the agency.
- w_t_payne 13y agoThat is the logical implication.
- grkvlt 13y agoNo, that is an insane implication.
- w_t_payne 13y agoIf they have access to the manufacturers, it would be the simplest, minimum-effort, minimum-risk approach. It is also what I would do, given the chance. Taking into account what we have learned this year about the extent of the activities of the intelligence services, I think we have to assume that somebody (Whether the NSA, the FSB or somebody else) has compromised the manufacture of at least part of the electronics and/or software supply-chain. I am not too sure what it would take to audit the software and hardware components in common use today?