3 ms·
>> Side question: what about an active MITM attack which changes the ciphersuite preferences? Part of the protocol involves exchanging checksums of all data pa
by Nursie 13y ago
>> Side question: what about an active MITM attack which changes the ciphersuite preferences?
Part of the protocol involves exchanging checksums of all data passed between the server and client. Can't remember off the top of my head exactly when this takes place, but effectively the whole handshake process is fed into a hash algorithm and if they don't match then the connection won't be established. The hash itself will be protected from MITM by some sort of signing/MAC.
- mnordhoff 13y agoIt happens during the Finished messages. The OP covers the handshake about halfway down, and 72deluxe's Wikipedia link covers it nicely, too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_handshake https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_h... In TLS 1.0 and 1.1, the Finished message is protected by HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1. (RFC 2246, sections 5 and 7.4.9.) (By the way, while there are attacks against MD5 and SHA-1, there are no known attacks against HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1. Don't freak out.) TLS 1.1 is the same as TLS 1.0. (RFC 4346, sections 5 and 7.4.9.) For TLS 1.2, I am uncertain which algorithm is used. See RFC 5246, sections 5 and 7.4.9. It's either HMAC-SHA256 or the MAC defined by the chosen cipher suite, which would currently be one of HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 or HMAC-SHA384. (As long as your weakest cipher suite's MAC can't be broken in half a second, this doesn't help an attacker.) Edit: Staring at RFC 5246 a bit longer, I am almost certain that TLS 1.2 will always use HMAC-SHA256. Future cipher suites may define a different algorithm, but no such cipher suites yet exist. (Edits: This post was basically written one sentence at a time in a dozen different edits.)
- Nursie 13y ago>> In TLS 1.0 and 1.1, the Finished message is protected by HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1. (RFC 2246, sections 5 and 7.4.9.) (By the way, while there are attacks against MD5 and SHA-1, there are no known attacks against HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1. Don't freak out.) Yeah, been reading up on HMAC lately. I had to implement a MAC algorithm due to a weird failing by an embedded platform vendor. HMAC(sha256) was it, until at the last minute we switched out for iso9797 algorithm 3, pad 3* because a second vendor we have to work with couldn't support 32 byte keys. It's always a bit sad to write beautiful code and then discard it again within days... (*why yes, it is a retail application)