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The thing you're not taking into account is that, even if GHash.io are trustworthy, this still makes them a single point of failure - any attacker who compromis
by makomk 13y ago
The thing you're not taking into account is that, even if GHash.io are trustworthy, this still makes them a single point of failure - any attacker who compromises their systems can carry out double spends, or they can even do it themselves and then blame it on an outsider. What's more, this has already happened with GHash.io and it hasn't damaged their reputation in the slightest. (Back when they were a smaller portion of the network, someone spotted malicious double spends of coins obviously linked to GHash.io that were equally obviously done using the miners they controlled. They blamed it on rogue insiders and everyone carried on using them.)
- yebyen 13y agoI mine with slush, at mining.bitcoin.cz I am not at all disputing that 51% attack is one of the known attacks and that 51% of hash power concentrated in the hands of any one actor is something to be prevented. I also dabble in alt-chains, and the Terracoin chain has often had 51-60% of the hash power in the Coinotron pool. It happened to GHash.io before, yes. I think they made it right. It's up to the rest of us to take our miners somewhere else to minimize the possibility of a rogue actor at GHash.io causing problems. As Coinotron once told me, a pool operator just runs a pool, can't control the users. There is no fair way to turn away hash power or "self-police" as a pool operator. I think if I read the graph correctly, the CDF provides a logarithmic probabilistic dis-incentive to be >50% of the hash power and also act fairly (in other words, to work on any broadcasted solved blocks that don't contain rewards belonging to you), so it will be interesting to see what happens next.