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Despite the good responses, there are two points that I believe are important that haven't been pointed out yet. 1. While a 51% pool operator could double spen
by nhaehnle 13y ago
Despite the good responses, there are two points that I believe are important that haven't been pointed out yet.
1. While a 51% pool operator could double spend, none of the participants can do that. The social incentives against a pool operator exploiting this power are very strong, however, because double spends are basically impossible to hide and would destroy the value Bitcoin - which is pretty much against the operator of a mining pool who is likely to hold significant amounts of Bitcoin herself.
2. There is a second possible exploit that is not so well known, which is that a >50% pool can capture all mining rewards. They can do so by never accepting a block mined by somebody else, and instead always mining on their private chain. This pool-specific chain will always ultimately become longer.
The loss of confidence associated with such an attack is probably smaller. So I would bet that if the pool operator has evil intentions, that would be the way to go for them.
- josu 13y agoI hadn't heard of the second possible attack that you mention until now. Could you please point me to an article or somewhere that develops the idea. I'm intrigued about what people predict that the miners of such pool would do in that scenario.
- nhaehnle 13y agoThe interesting point about the second possible attack is that a weaker form is possible even with less than 50% of the hashing power. The term to search for in a search engine is "selfish mining", e.g. here: http://bitcoinmagazine.com/7953/selfish-mining-a-25-attack-against-the-bitcoin-network/ http://bitcoinmagazine.com/7953/selfish-mining-a-25-attack-a...
- mapt 13y agoCan #2 be turned on and off in a controllable manner, such that it grants only a modest statistical advantage (sufficient, say, to keep the pool above 50%) ?
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]