7 ms·

I just think it's not as simple as that. I may very well not be able to distinguish the difference between electrode-stimulation and actual-cake-in-my-mouth. Wh

I just think it's not as simple as that. I may very well not be able to distinguish the difference between electrode-stimulation and actual-cake-in-my-mouth. What I'm trying to say is that I don't believe that even an exhaustive list of physical information about my brain includes "what it is like" for me to have the experience qua experience.

hcarvalhoalves 13y ago
I see you work with UX. I guess you have an underlying belief that we're unique snowflakes, based on your training/experience, so the idea that experience can be captured by brain states feels too reductionist and has to be explained by an unknown mechanism... but let me suggest that it seems to be quite the contrary. Attributing it entirely to matter actually validates the notion that each individual reacts differently to the same stimuli, because each organism has a unique constitution, neuronal activation levels, brain chemistry, etc., which in turn are all influenced by genetics, environment, study, diet. In other words, we're really the result of accumulated experiences, thus unique, and experience things uniquely. The point is that common physics alone seem enough to validate that intution.
- robmclarty 13y ago
  First, argumentum ad hominem (if you don't know what that means, you can read about it here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem). Second, my background is actually in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence which includes Comp Sci., Psych, Psycholinguistics, Linguistics, and Philosophy. That is to say, I've put some serious thought into these issues and am not making opinions willy nilly. Third, personally, I want to be able to explain the universe in terms of neat physical laws and mathematical formulae. But I don't think (at the moment) that what we have (yet) sufficiently explains what's going on (especially in terms of consciousness). The common "explanation" for what consciousness is (usually put forth by materialist-determinist science) is that it simply emerges from a certain complexity of matter (put enough genes and DNA and neurons together and, bam, consciousness). I just feel like that begs the question. If we're going to explain what consciousness is I think we need to do better than that. That's all.
  - Luc 13y ago
    It's all atoms bumping into each other, designed by Darwinian evolution working over a period of 3.6 billion years to design mechanisms so complex that describing and simulating their complete interaction will be the work of generations. Along the way new physics theories may arise, but that won't change anything about the fact that it's all Quantum Mechanics. Just like you can have thermodynamics without knowing the lowest level of interactions, or in fact like Darwin was right about evolution without knowing about DNA.
  - hcarvalhoalves 13y ago
    My intention wasn't to attack you at all, so sorry if I offended. I was just trying to think from your shoes based on what is in your profile. I didn't knew you had a background in C.S. In that case, it's even more interesting, to me, that you think like that. Given your background you certainly know about neural networks, and what the simplest models are capable of. You probably also understand how emergent and apparently random behavior can arise from well define frameworks (Rule30, prime numbers distribution). It's intriguing to me that in light of evidences like that, it's still required for consciousness to be explained by something other than emergent behavior. And I don't think "put enough genes and DNA and neurons together and, bam, consciousness" captures the issue. That may produce a machinery like the brain, but doesn't necessarily produces consciousness. My hunch is that consciousness is the convergence of feedback loops and the perception of boundaries, allowing the distinction between myself vs. environment, and that should be conditional of a certain structure. I believe we'll be closer to understand consciousness by trying to reproduce it.
    - robmclarty 13y ago
      Cool. First of all, just let me say, that arguing about consciousness today has been very exciting and fun. Thanks for participating :D My position is not the norm, for sure. I used to think along the lines you're describing (some sort of Churchland connectionism or dynamic system), and was driven to find a way of reducing consciousness to something that could be reproduced in a computer. But the more I learned the more I saw the gap between neurons and experience. I don't know for sure if it couldn't eventually be explained with some future advanced physical/chemical/biological theory, but right now there seems to be a big gap. If we could look at all the pieces leading up to experience under a microscope, I still don't think there would be a way of seeing someone's experience or subject it to proper scientific scrutiny short of actually being that someone. That is, I don't believe that any set of facts would ever allow me to know what it's like to be someone else. I think the monism Nagel describes in the book I linked to is an interesting idea of how things like consciousness, cognition, value, and intentionality can be compatible with materialist realism while still being something different without necessarily deriving from divine intervention or subjective idealism.

hcarvalhoalves 13y ago

I see you work with UX. I guess you have an underlying belief that we're unique snowflakes, based on your training/experience, so the idea that experience can be captured by brain states feels too reductionist and has to be explained by an unknown mechanism... but let me suggest that it seems to be quite the contrary. Attributing it entirely to matter actually validates the notion that each individual reacts differently to the same stimuli, because each organism has a unique constitution, neuronal activation levels, brain chemistry, etc., which in turn are all influenced by genetics, environment, study, diet. In other words, we're really the result of accumulated experiences, thus unique, and experience things uniquely. The point is that common physics alone seem enough to validate that intution.

robmclarty 13y ago
First, argumentum ad hominem (if you don't know what that means, you can read about it here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem). Second, my background is actually in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence which includes Comp Sci., Psych, Psycholinguistics, Linguistics, and Philosophy. That is to say, I've put some serious thought into these issues and am not making opinions willy nilly. Third, personally, I want to be able to explain the universe in terms of neat physical laws and mathematical formulae. But I don't think (at the moment) that what we have (yet) sufficiently explains what's going on (especially in terms of consciousness). The common "explanation" for what consciousness is (usually put forth by materialist-determinist science) is that it simply emerges from a certain complexity of matter (put enough genes and DNA and neurons together and, bam, consciousness). I just feel like that begs the question. If we're going to explain what consciousness is I think we need to do better than that. That's all.
- Luc 13y ago
  It's all atoms bumping into each other, designed by Darwinian evolution working over a period of 3.6 billion years to design mechanisms so complex that describing and simulating their complete interaction will be the work of generations. Along the way new physics theories may arise, but that won't change anything about the fact that it's all Quantum Mechanics. Just like you can have thermodynamics without knowing the lowest level of interactions, or in fact like Darwin was right about evolution without knowing about DNA.
- hcarvalhoalves 13y ago
  My intention wasn't to attack you at all, so sorry if I offended. I was just trying to think from your shoes based on what is in your profile. I didn't knew you had a background in C.S. In that case, it's even more interesting, to me, that you think like that. Given your background you certainly know about neural networks, and what the simplest models are capable of. You probably also understand how emergent and apparently random behavior can arise from well define frameworks (Rule30, prime numbers distribution). It's intriguing to me that in light of evidences like that, it's still required for consciousness to be explained by something other than emergent behavior. And I don't think "put enough genes and DNA and neurons together and, bam, consciousness" captures the issue. That may produce a machinery like the brain, but doesn't necessarily produces consciousness. My hunch is that consciousness is the convergence of feedback loops and the perception of boundaries, allowing the distinction between myself vs. environment, and that should be conditional of a certain structure. I believe we'll be closer to understand consciousness by trying to reproduce it.
  - robmclarty 13y ago
    Cool. First of all, just let me say, that arguing about consciousness today has been very exciting and fun. Thanks for participating :D My position is not the norm, for sure. I used to think along the lines you're describing (some sort of Churchland connectionism or dynamic system), and was driven to find a way of reducing consciousness to something that could be reproduced in a computer. But the more I learned the more I saw the gap between neurons and experience. I don't know for sure if it couldn't eventually be explained with some future advanced physical/chemical/biological theory, but right now there seems to be a big gap. If we could look at all the pieces leading up to experience under a microscope, I still don't think there would be a way of seeing someone's experience or subject it to proper scientific scrutiny short of actually being that someone. That is, I don't believe that any set of facts would ever allow me to know what it's like to be someone else. I think the monism Nagel describes in the book I linked to is an interesting idea of how things like consciousness, cognition, value, and intentionality can be compatible with materialist realism while still being something different without necessarily deriving from divine intervention or subjective idealism.