12 ms·
The Tuesday boy problem, in under 300 words
- ggreer 13y agoThis is incorrect. There's no reason to assume that the stranger will say, "at least one of them is a girl" only in the case of GG. In the case of BB, the stranger will always say, "At least one is a boy." Given GB or BG, they have even odds of saying "at least one is a boy" vs "at least one is a girl." Given GG, the stranger will always say, "At least one is a girl." The correct diagram would be this: http://abughrai.be/pics/boy_probability.png http://abughrai.be/pics/boy_probability.png For the probabilities in that post to apply, the stranger would say, "I have two children." Then you ask, "Is at least one of them a boy?" and they answer, "Yes." Edit: Of course, the answer to, "Given there are two siblings and one is a boy, what are the chances both are boys?" is 1/3. But the phrasing of the puzzle does not reflect that question.
- javert 13y agoThe post is not about the probability of what a person with a given pair of children will say. Rather, what they said is given, and the question is: what pair of children do they have? You are either going over my head or under my head, so this will probably make one of us temporarily look a bit foolish :).
- ggreer 13y agoThe blog post[1] that the author based his short explanation on goes into this. Peter Winkler, a math professor at Dartmouth, is quoted in it[2]: Suppose the puzzle is phrased this way: X says “I have two children and at least one is a boy.” What is the probability that the other is a boy? Put this way, the puzzle is highly ambiguous. Computer scientists, cryptologists and others who must deal carefully with message-passing know that what counts is not what a person says (even if she is known never to lie) but under what circumstances would she have said it. The way the puzzle is phrased, the only way to get 1/3 as an answer is to assume that parents with one girl will never say, "At least one of them is a girl." 1. http://scienceblogs.com/evolutionblog/2011/11/08/the-tuesday-birthday-problem/ http://scienceblogs.com/evolutionblog/2011/11/08/the-tuesday... 2. http://blog.tanyakhovanova.com/?p=234 http://blog.tanyakhovanova.com/?p=234
- javert 13y agoThanks for the clarification, though I think my point stands. > The way the puzzle is phrased, the only way to get 1/3 as an answer is to assume that parents with one girl will never say, "At least one of them is a girl." Right. But that is assumed, because the puzzle states that the parent says, "At least one of them is a boy." In other words, "Put this way, the puzzle is highly ambiguous." No, not it is not. It is absolutely not ambiguous. I made this point in a different comment for a different blog post with the same example, but: both things you link to contain a fallacy, as follows. "Suppose we know that a certain man has two children and we also know that the older one is a boy" IMPLIES "Now suppose we know simply that a man has two children and that one of them is a son. This time we would reason that there is no possibility that the person has two girls. It follows that the sexes of his two children, ordered from oldest to youngest, are either BB, BG or GB...." You can't conclude, as these authors do, from the first case, that the other child's gender is 1/2, and from the second, it is 1/3. It's not that the two cases are different (in any important way); they are not; one implies the other. It's that in the 1/2 case, the person is naive, and in the 1/3 case, the person takes into account the known fact that there is a 1/2 chance per child of getting a certain gender, thus allowing the BB/BG/GB/GG analysis.
- Confusion 13y agoFine, then I pose to you the same problem description, with the added fact that the stranger is proud of having a boy, will only draw attention to a boy and will thus say "at least one is a boy", independent of whether the other is a girl, while he would never say "at least one is a boy". You can't solve a logic puzzle by arguing the psychology of a persona depicted in the puzzle.
- stephencanon 13y agoYou can’t solve a logic puzzle that way, but you can explain the pragmatics of why the “logical” answer is contrary to our expectations based on interaction with real people.
- glenngillen 13y agoAfaict tell the initial range of possibilities is: GG GB BB The relative ages of the children play no part, they could be twins for all I care. So the initial probabilty of being BB is 1/3. Knowing one of them is a boy then removes GG as an option, and the probability for BB unsurprisingly becomes 1/2. What am I misunderstanding in this problem?
- aytekin 13y agoIt matters if the assumption is that possibility of each child being boy/girl is 50%. The first child can be boy or girl. The second child can also be boy or girl. So the probabilities are like this: BB: 25% GG: 25% BG: 50% You can replace older/younger on the article with child 1/child 2.
- te 13y agoThat GB is twice as likely as either GG or BB. For this reason, reference is made to BG to make this more apparent.
- gametheoretic 13y agoYou only misunderstand because the author is presenting it stupidly (as you state, incorporating order where order is irrelevant), leading to his own stupid conclusion. Read my post elsewhere in the thread for the full explanation, and if you find this kind of thing interesting, look up the Monty Hall problem (the point of which is that changing the information changes the odds).
- acchow 13y agoThis explanation ignores the two perspectives of probability - assertions on states of the world (the "frequentist" view) vs. states of the mind (the "bayesian" view). See also http://lesswrong.com/lw/oj/probability_is_in_the_mind/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/oj/probability_is_in_the_mind/
- klodolph 13y agoIt has nothing to do with frequentist versus bayesian statistics this is really just a pure probability theory problem.
- ggreer 13y agoThis exact puzzle is discussed in http://lesswrong.com/lw/ul/my_bayesian_enlightenment/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/ul/my_bayesian_enlightenment/: I responded—note that this was completely spontaneous—"What on Earth do you mean? You can't avoid assigning a probability to the mathematician making one statement or another. You're just assuming the probability is 1, and that's unjustified." While the equations of probability theory are agreed upon, there are multiple interpretations[1]. In some ways, it's like QM.[2] 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations#Philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations#Phi... 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mech...
- javert 13y agoAs far as I can tell, that blog post contains a "bait and switch." Here it is: > But suppose that instead you had asked, "Is your eldest child a boy?" and the mathematician had answered "Yes." Then the probability of the mathematician having two boys would be 1/2. Since the eldest child is a boy, and the younger child can be anything it pleases. No, it cannot be "anything it pleases." That is the whole point of the blog post that we are all commenting about here on HN, which is re-told on the blog post you are linking to. Since the post you are linking to is misrepresenting one side of the "argument," I strongly suggest that there is no actual apparentl contradiction here that needs to be resolved. Yes, you can talk about the actual probability of something vs. making the best possible prediction you have. A good example raised in this post is the point about a biased coin; you know it is biased but not which way, so you assign odds of .5 for heads and .5 for tails. Fine. This is not some massive philosophical conundrum. The fact is that actual knowledge is neither purely "out there" (e.g. "in the cards") nor purely "in here" (in the mind). This is the classic rationalism vs. empiricism debate, which was settled by Ayn Rand's theory of objective knowledge, where she answers that knowledge is in man's mind, but it is knowledge of external reality. So, "both." Not understanding this, and other basic epistemological errors, seem to plague lesswrong.com. It is embarassing to see them supposedly championing "reason" under a non-objective epistemology. They come to bizarre conclusions, and that is, at least partially, why.
- gametheoretic 13y agoThis is wrong. In oversimplifying your table for potential idiot readers by introducing the silent variable of older vs younger child, you have introduced order into a statistics problem wherein order is irrelevant and masked the fact that what matters is which of the children you already know to be a boy. You grant this difference for the BG pairing, thus producing two options, but not for the BB pairing. There is not ONE way of knowing this for BB, as you present in the table, but two: you know the older is the boy, or you know the younger is the boy. 2/4 = 1/2. QED. What you should have done in the first place, however (unless your aim is to produce a blog post which, apparently, can convince otherwise intelligent people that irrelevant information can magically become relevant) was simply remove the one boy from the equation and reformulate the question. What is the probability that this other child is a boy (and thus that both are boys)? 1/2. Fuck the table. Had you not used a table, this would never have happened. But it feels authoritative, right? Thank you for the psychology lesson. . . . Downvotes but not refutations, because there aren't any. I'll assume it's my tone. My opinion of the competence of the average reader on this site has plummeted reading the other comments, however, so hey, fuck you guys too. :)
- klodolph 13y agoYou're oversimplifying. The problem is the interpretation of the question in precise terms. We are given some background information and then told the observation of a particular random variable. In the given article, the random variable is interpreted as "yes/no: at least one child is a boy born on a Tuesday". Rambling about "order" does not change the fact that the article is correct, given the definition of the random variable that is observed. The problem is that this interpretation is only correct if you imagine that you are always given the observation of the same random variable no matter what the genders or birthdays of the children actually are. For example, if I had two girls born on Wednesday, I would then tell you "no child is a boy born on a Tuesday". That's an unlikely scenario which is what makes it legitimately surprising. It's like the Monty Hall problem. What if the host picks the door in advance? What if the host only opens a door with a goat under the condition that you picked the door with the prize? What if the host only opens a door with a goat under the condition that you picked the wrong door? The article has problems but "wrong" is not one of them. > so hey, fuck you guys too Hacker News is a terrible place to visit if you want to take the voting system personally. Don't make this about you. It's about the post.
- archgoon 13y agoThe original article is more interesting and sheds light on the hidden assumptions that go into the calculation. It also considers under which sets of assumptions the answer is not 1/2. http://scienceblogs.com/evolutionblog/2011/11/08/the-tuesday-birthday-problem/ http://scienceblogs.com/evolutionblog/2011/11/08/the-tuesday... The attempt at shortening it down to under 300 words omits all the complications and subtlety involved in the problem.
- willvarfar 13y ago> Now, we should mention at this point that we are discussing mathematical children who have no existence outside the world of probabilistic brainteasers. So we’re not worrying about the fact that a disproportionate number of children are born on Mondays and Tuesdays, since C-sections aren’t usually scheduled for the weekends. We’re also not worrying about twins or triplets. Or any other sort of “real world” consideration that might occur to you. The one that occurred to me is that the probability of getting a boy or girl is not 50%, and the probability of getting two same-gender children is not 50% either. Here are some nice real stats: http://www.in-gender.com/XYU/Odds/Gender_Odds.aspx http://www.in-gender.com/XYU/Odds/Gender_Odds.aspx
- kevinjones 13y agoI also thought the original article was better, and clearer. As you say—it's the hidden assumptions which are interesting. In maths exams at school the problems are always presented in the form of: "a random family was chosen from ...". (Similar to "a smooth cube is resting on a smooth surface". In real life, it's more difficult. The original article looks at real life, whereas the 300-word version has reduced it to the exam version. Of course it's "easier" to understand the exam version, but this wasn't the point.
- valtron 13y ago"I have a two children, one of which is a boy. What's the probability the other is a boy?" Intuition wrongly treats the possibilities as sets and assigns probabilities 1/2 BB, 1/2 GB, rather than 1/3 BB, 1/3 GB, 1/3 BG.
- hislaziness 13y agoWhat if they are twins? The explanation does not cover that and it sure changes the probabilities.
- klodolph 13y agoIf we're going to bring reality into this, I think we have to take into account the fact that only very weird people tell you that "at least one child is a boy born on a Tuesday" and we have to consider the possibility that they are lying in order to test your knowledge of probability.
- hudibras 13y agoAnd if we're really going to bring reality into this, then we'll need to consider the ages of the children, because of the at-birth sex ratio (105 newborn boys for every 100 newborn girls[0]) and differing mortality rates for each sex. [0]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_sex_ratio http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_sex_ratio
- chris_wot 13y agoI think it's probably good to be precise in this case. It should state that "at least one child is a boy born on a Tuesday, but one is older than the other by at least a day".
- millstone 13y agoWhat I dislike about this question is the flavor text. It seems designed to mislead the reader by invoking their “realism node,” and then requiring them to suspend it. From archgoon’s link: > "This puzzle confounds people legitimately, however, because most of the ways in which you are likely to find out that X has at least one boy contain an implicit bias which changes the answer.” Exactly right. The phrasing in the problem asks the reader to consider a particular scenario, not isolated facts. Consider what happens if you take the question at its word: > If a person on the street says to you, "I have two children," what is the probability that they're both boys? Hell if I know. Maybe one is a boy and the other is a grown man? Or maybe he has five children, BBGGG. “I have two children, both of which are boys” is technically correct if there’s two boys and three girls, right? Or maybe he’s just outright lying! How do I assign a probability to any of those? Consider this phrasing instead: “If you flip a coin twice, and the first and/or the second is heads, what’s the probability that both are heads?” I’d expect more people to get this right than the boy/girl question. Also, as an aside, punctuation is important: “I have two children. At least, one of them is a boy.” (Yikes!)
- heyitsnick 13y ago"I met a man on the street, he said he had two children. I asked him, is at least one of them a boy? He said yes. What's the probability both of them are boys?" This removes the whole ambiguity of why he would assert "at least one of them is a boy," but still makes the question a bit tricky/counter-intuitive, which is useful for teaching the quirks of probability.
- zamalek 13y agoWhat occurred to me is that as more conditions are added to the question the answer seems to tend toward the naive assumption of 1/2 (in his explanation 0.25, 0.33, 0.42, 0.48). This is like a strange cross-over between word problems, probability and unbelievably calculus. Essentially: lim[generic -> specific] f(P("is one child of two a boy")) = 1/2 Obviously I have no proof for it but it is an interesting observation.