8 ms·

This working group has failed

127 points by mmoya 13y ago

y0ghur7_xxx 13y ago
Looks like it's down. Cache: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10598.html&hl=en&strip=1 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https:/...
vacri 13y ago
Following the thread, the TLS 1.2 spec was completed in 2008, but it wasn't supported in OpenSSL until mid-2012 - so anything that depends on OpenSSL had to wait until at least then, then go through the implentation and reshipping, then trickle on down to the end vendors. And with no-one using TLS 1.2 or having a need for it because it wasn't available, it was back-burnered by the browsers. The follow-up comments paint a much fuller picture of why things are delayed, where the failures are, and what's going on.
- makomk 13y ago
  If you read the follow-ups, it's not just that no-one used TLS 1.2 because it wasn't available, enabling support for it actually broke stuff for end users[1] - and the browser developers knew this was almost certain to be the case even without looking, because it almost always is. Also, as the linked email points out, we shouldn't have needed TLS 1.2 in the first place in order to be secure. It was already known at the time TLS 1.0 was designed that they were doing things in ways likely to be insecure for no good reason, but they did it anyway. [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10614.html https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10614.h...
  - fulafel 13y ago
    Buggy Middleboxes broke. They're increasingly preventing deployment of new protocols and apps on the internet.
lazyjones 13y ago
Specs designed by committee usually fail when they produce just the "paper" and no reference implementation. Look at W3C, which consistently failed to develop their own reference browser. The same seems true for TLS, actual implementations are too complicated because the committee paid no attention to this. A positive example is MP3, where everyone just copied the reference codec in the beginning.
- octo_t 13y ago
  A good example here would be C++. Look at how long it took for C++11 to be implemented, but now at least two compilers are feature complete (gcc + clang) and now they're on schedule to be feature complete for C++1y[1], with implementation + specification in sync. [1] http://clang.llvm.org/cxx_status.html#cxx14 http://clang.llvm.org/cxx_status.html#cxx14
  - MichaelGG 13y ago
    It also helps that C++ doesn't have nearly the number of implementers in position to screw stuff up. Unlike any number of webservers, SSL libraries, load-balancers, firewalls, proxies, etc. How many C++11 compilers are there? This support matrix[1] seems to indicate there are 2 compilers in the lead, with 5 providing fairly decent coverage. How popular is XLC++? And anyways, adding another compiler is something you choose to do, and usually run a bit of tests for, right? Unlike networking protocols where it's invisible to you that someone has some idiotic inspection hardware that segfaults on certain packets and drops your connection. Edit: Also, even if two compilers are feature complete, it doesn't mean they implement the features in perfectly compatible ways, right? 1: https://wiki.apache.org/stdcxx/C%2B%2B0xCompilerSupport https://wiki.apache.org/stdcxx/C%2B%2B0xCompilerSupport
  - Sharlin 13y ago
    And C++11 itself was implemented awfully quickly compared to C++03, exactly because this time around the Committee was much stricter about having reference (or at the very least prototype) implementations available before accepting anything into the Standard. As you mentioned, C++14 actually seems to be proceeding like it optimally should, so the Committee has certainly learned its lessons regarding this.
makomk 13y ago
Given recent revelations, one has to wonder if the working group merely failed by itself or was given a substantial nudge in that direction by someone who wanted TLS to be insecure.
- MichaelGG 13y ago
  Apart from specific contributions by the NSA (if any?), is it hard to believe people screwed up? Look at HTML standards and what a mess that is. Hell, look at HTTP and the insane stuff in that spec. I'm guessing spec writing is much harder than one might assume, especially if you're not writing elegant code to implement the protocol at the same time. Committees only make things worse, and the IETF RFC format doesn't help either. (Reading the SCSI specs, by comparison, with their nice graphical diagrams, is much cleaner - not that a simple RFC can't convey the same info, but nice diagrams do really help.) Extensibility is something people get wrong all the time - the TLS 1.2 issue seems to be that enabling TLS 1.2 ends up breaking lots of users. Without someone familiar with the subject pointing out exact contributions (I'd assume repeated issues raised by the same group of people), normal incompetence is more than enough to explain things, isn't it?
  - gsnedders 13y ago
    Spec writing is only half the challenge (and arguably a relatively easy one!). A big problem with HTML and HTTP is the fact that error handling has always been undefined (the current HTML spec is the first real attempt to define error handling!) — so different people implement different things, and then when you end up with a single implementation with ~90% marketshare, everyone has to reverse-engineer that (and probably not perfectly!). Combine this with the fact that the majority of implementers of HTML and (to a only slightly less extent) HTTP are web developers who just want to get stuff working — they've never read a page of the spec in their life. So, guess what, they end up relying upon client's error-handling (typically the intersection of clients they care about — which when IE had 90%+ marketshare was often just IE, then see above about reverse-engineering). The other big problem is the lack of generic test suites for the standards — far too often each implementer ends up writing their own tests, and then not sharing them (the IETF still has no real general infrastructure for hosting testsuites for RFCs!). At least around the W3C, there's been a relatively large movement in the past three years or thereabouts towards developing shared testsuites, in large part down to various Microsoft and Opera people (myself included, in the early days, as a disclaimer) and several WG chairs (trying to push specs to REC — which nowadays requires two interoperable implementations, and hence practically a testsuite), so things are at least slowly changing there. But there's still a lot of work to be done — and it's one area where improvements can have large effects, as it increases the consistency of all implementations, and makes it easier for smaller, and newer, competitors to enter the market.
MichaelGG 13y ago
Here's an interesting post about TLS compatibility[1]. I guess it explains why no browsers have had TLS 1.2 on by default for such a long time. " To add to this discussion about protocol version intolerance, I've been tracking this problem in my SSL Pulse data set (SSL servers from the Alexa top 1 million). Here's what I have for November: Total servers: 163,587 TLS 1.0 intolerance 9 TLS 1.1 intolerance 1,388 TLS 1.2 intolerance 1,448 (~ 0.9%) TLS 1.3 intolerance 17,840 (~10.9%) TLS 2.98 intolerance 122,698 (~75.0%) Long handshake intolerance: 4,795 (~2.9%) " 1: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10657.html https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10657.h...
- bradleyjg 13y ago
  There's a trade-off to be made. On the one hand browser users would like every page to "just work". On the other hand they want secure connections to actually be secure. If those .9% of websites break in the latest versions of firefox, chrome, and IE they are more likely to be fixed than if they are coddled through some workaround or even worse by holding back general progress. The former is better for web security. On the other hand, people who want to go to those websites in the meantime will be inconvenienced. Perhaps a compromise is to build the workaround, but put in an interstitial scare screen. That might generate the desirable social pressure on the website owner without making it impossible to visit.
  - gsnedders 13y ago
    > On the other hand, people who want to go to those websites in the meantime will be inconvenienced. …and they may well move to another browser which doesn't support TLS/1.2, or stay on an out-of-date (insecure!) version of the browser, which doesn't help web security either.
deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
parennoob 13y ago
Maybe making things more intelligible would help instead of using language that is extremely obfuscated and confusing, and unaccompanied by any actual mathematics? Take this sentence from the email for instance: "Even AES-GCM got screwed up: nonces should be counters, but all implementations make them random, introducing an artificial birthday bound issue due to truncation in the standard." I have no idea WTF this means, but let's go over it: nonce: I know this is a randomly generated number that can be only used once -- now why should it be a counter? No idea. "but all implementations make them random": wait, aren't they supposed to be random by definition? According to the above line though, they are supposed to be random. Damn, what I knew must be wrong. I wonder if this person on the internet has submitted some sort of explanation about this somewhere. 'artificial birthday bound issue': Assuming this refers to the birthday attack (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack). Why is it "artificial"? Can we see some mathematical proofs attached please? I sort of get the idea here -- because the nonce is random, it is vulnerable to being recreated after a certain number of attempts, but there is nothing concrete attached here. Or I could be totally wrong in this interpretation. God knows, and maybe this chap. "...due to truncation in the standard." -- Do you mean some sort of mathematical truncation, i.e. "my number was truncated to 16 bits", or truncation of the standard itself "the last section of the standard was removed"? Please be clear. Same goes for most things related to crypto -- if you want stuff like TLS to be examined by more eyeballs and find more bugs, you have to first try and make it more accessible. The sentences above are, in my opinion, a complete communication failure.
- jheriko 13y ago
  i know little but i strongly suspect the artificialness of the birthday bound is specific to this situation. the bound shouldn't be there, but by using random numbers it is introduces - its 'artificial' because an idealised implementation would not suffer that problem. you are right though, excessive jargon is a massive blocker for anything not just because its unintelligible but also because of the 'elitism' social signal it sends... many unspectacular people can find holes in a cryptographic system - in many cases common sense or a little ingenuity is enough - but they will generally not know the term for their specific flavour of attack (attack is a term itself) or the surrounding terminology to describe it in the context of cryptography. in short, its not complicated, its obfuscated...

127 points by mmoya 13y ago

Looks like it's down. Cache: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10598.html&hl=en&strip=1 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https:/...

vacri 13y ago

Following the thread, the TLS 1.2 spec was completed in 2008, but it wasn't supported in OpenSSL until mid-2012 - so anything that depends on OpenSSL had to wait until at least then, then go through the implentation and reshipping, then trickle on down to the end vendors. And with no-one using TLS 1.2 or having a need for it because it wasn't available, it was back-burnered by the browsers. The follow-up comments paint a much fuller picture of why things are delayed, where the failures are, and what's going on.

makomk 13y ago
If you read the follow-ups, it's not just that no-one used TLS 1.2 because it wasn't available, enabling support for it actually broke stuff for end users[1] - and the browser developers knew this was almost certain to be the case even without looking, because it almost always is. Also, as the linked email points out, we shouldn't have needed TLS 1.2 in the first place in order to be secure. It was already known at the time TLS 1.0 was designed that they were doing things in ways likely to be insecure for no good reason, but they did it anyway. [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10614.html https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10614.h...
- fulafel 13y ago
  Buggy Middleboxes broke. They're increasingly preventing deployment of new protocols and apps on the internet.

lazyjones 13y ago

Specs designed by committee usually fail when they produce just the "paper" and no reference implementation. Look at W3C, which consistently failed to develop their own reference browser. The same seems true for TLS, actual implementations are too complicated because the committee paid no attention to this. A positive example is MP3, where everyone just copied the reference codec in the beginning.

octo_t 13y ago
A good example here would be C++. Look at how long it took for C++11 to be implemented, but now at least two compilers are feature complete (gcc + clang) and now they're on schedule to be feature complete for C++1y[1], with implementation + specification in sync. [1] http://clang.llvm.org/cxx_status.html#cxx14 http://clang.llvm.org/cxx_status.html#cxx14
- MichaelGG 13y ago
  It also helps that C++ doesn't have nearly the number of implementers in position to screw stuff up. Unlike any number of webservers, SSL libraries, load-balancers, firewalls, proxies, etc. How many C++11 compilers are there? This support matrix[1] seems to indicate there are 2 compilers in the lead, with 5 providing fairly decent coverage. How popular is XLC++? And anyways, adding another compiler is something you choose to do, and usually run a bit of tests for, right? Unlike networking protocols where it's invisible to you that someone has some idiotic inspection hardware that segfaults on certain packets and drops your connection. Edit: Also, even if two compilers are feature complete, it doesn't mean they implement the features in perfectly compatible ways, right? 1: https://wiki.apache.org/stdcxx/C%2B%2B0xCompilerSupport https://wiki.apache.org/stdcxx/C%2B%2B0xCompilerSupport
- Sharlin 13y ago
  And C++11 itself was implemented awfully quickly compared to C++03, exactly because this time around the Committee was much stricter about having reference (or at the very least prototype) implementations available before accepting anything into the Standard. As you mentioned, C++14 actually seems to be proceeding like it optimally should, so the Committee has certainly learned its lessons regarding this.

makomk 13y ago

Given recent revelations, one has to wonder if the working group merely failed by itself or was given a substantial nudge in that direction by someone who wanted TLS to be insecure.

MichaelGG 13y ago
Apart from specific contributions by the NSA (if any?), is it hard to believe people screwed up? Look at HTML standards and what a mess that is. Hell, look at HTTP and the insane stuff in that spec. I'm guessing spec writing is much harder than one might assume, especially if you're not writing elegant code to implement the protocol at the same time. Committees only make things worse, and the IETF RFC format doesn't help either. (Reading the SCSI specs, by comparison, with their nice graphical diagrams, is much cleaner - not that a simple RFC can't convey the same info, but nice diagrams do really help.) Extensibility is something people get wrong all the time - the TLS 1.2 issue seems to be that enabling TLS 1.2 ends up breaking lots of users. Without someone familiar with the subject pointing out exact contributions (I'd assume repeated issues raised by the same group of people), normal incompetence is more than enough to explain things, isn't it?
- gsnedders 13y ago
  Spec writing is only half the challenge (and arguably a relatively easy one!). A big problem with HTML and HTTP is the fact that error handling has always been undefined (the current HTML spec is the first real attempt to define error handling!) — so different people implement different things, and then when you end up with a single implementation with ~90% marketshare, everyone has to reverse-engineer that (and probably not perfectly!). Combine this with the fact that the majority of implementers of HTML and (to a only slightly less extent) HTTP are web developers who just want to get stuff working — they've never read a page of the spec in their life. So, guess what, they end up relying upon client's error-handling (typically the intersection of clients they care about — which when IE had 90%+ marketshare was often just IE, then see above about reverse-engineering). The other big problem is the lack of generic test suites for the standards — far too often each implementer ends up writing their own tests, and then not sharing them (the IETF still has no real general infrastructure for hosting testsuites for RFCs!). At least around the W3C, there's been a relatively large movement in the past three years or thereabouts towards developing shared testsuites, in large part down to various Microsoft and Opera people (myself included, in the early days, as a disclaimer) and several WG chairs (trying to push specs to REC — which nowadays requires two interoperable implementations, and hence practically a testsuite), so things are at least slowly changing there. But there's still a lot of work to be done — and it's one area where improvements can have large effects, as it increases the consistency of all implementations, and makes it easier for smaller, and newer, competitors to enter the market.

MichaelGG 13y ago

Here's an interesting post about TLS compatibility[1]. I guess it explains why no browsers have had TLS 1.2 on by default for such a long time. " To add to this discussion about protocol version intolerance, I've been tracking this problem in my SSL Pulse data set (SSL servers from the Alexa top 1 million). Here's what I have for November: Total servers: 163,587 TLS 1.0 intolerance 9 TLS 1.1 intolerance 1,388 TLS 1.2 intolerance 1,448 (~ 0.9%) TLS 1.3 intolerance 17,840 (~10.9%) TLS 2.98 intolerance 122,698 (~75.0%) Long handshake intolerance: 4,795 (~2.9%) " 1: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10657.html https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10657.h...

bradleyjg 13y ago
There's a trade-off to be made. On the one hand browser users would like every page to "just work". On the other hand they want secure connections to actually be secure. If those .9% of websites break in the latest versions of firefox, chrome, and IE they are more likely to be fixed than if they are coddled through some workaround or even worse by holding back general progress. The former is better for web security. On the other hand, people who want to go to those websites in the meantime will be inconvenienced. Perhaps a compromise is to build the workaround, but put in an interstitial scare screen. That might generate the desirable social pressure on the website owner without making it impossible to visit.
- gsnedders 13y ago
  > On the other hand, people who want to go to those websites in the meantime will be inconvenienced. …and they may well move to another browser which doesn't support TLS/1.2, or stay on an out-of-date (insecure!) version of the browser, which doesn't help web security either.

deleted 13y ago

[deleted]

parennoob 13y ago

Maybe making things more intelligible would help instead of using language that is extremely obfuscated and confusing, and unaccompanied by any actual mathematics? Take this sentence from the email for instance: "Even AES-GCM got screwed up: nonces should be counters, but all implementations make them random, introducing an artificial birthday bound issue due to truncation in the standard." I have no idea WTF this means, but let's go over it: nonce: I know this is a randomly generated number that can be only used once -- now why should it be a counter? No idea. "but all implementations make them random": wait, aren't they supposed to be random by definition? According to the above line though, they are supposed to be random. Damn, what I knew must be wrong. I wonder if this person on the internet has submitted some sort of explanation about this somewhere. 'artificial birthday bound issue': Assuming this refers to the birthday attack (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack). Why is it "artificial"? Can we see some mathematical proofs attached please? I sort of get the idea here -- because the nonce is random, it is vulnerable to being recreated after a certain number of attempts, but there is nothing concrete attached here. Or I could be totally wrong in this interpretation. God knows, and maybe this chap. "...due to truncation in the standard." -- Do you mean some sort of mathematical truncation, i.e. "my number was truncated to 16 bits", or truncation of the standard itself "the last section of the standard was removed"? Please be clear. Same goes for most things related to crypto -- if you want stuff like TLS to be examined by more eyeballs and find more bugs, you have to first try and make it more accessible. The sentences above are, in my opinion, a complete communication failure.

jheriko 13y ago
i know little but i strongly suspect the artificialness of the birthday bound is specific to this situation. the bound shouldn't be there, but by using random numbers it is introduces - its 'artificial' because an idealised implementation would not suffer that problem. you are right though, excessive jargon is a massive blocker for anything not just because its unintelligible but also because of the 'elitism' social signal it sends... many unspectacular people can find holes in a cryptographic system - in many cases common sense or a little ingenuity is enough - but they will generally not know the term for their specific flavour of attack (attack is a term itself) or the surrounding terminology to describe it in the context of cryptography. in short, its not complicated, its obfuscated...