>the NSA isn't compromising the company producing the device, they're compromising the delivery chain which handles all (most) devices. We have substantial evi

>the NSA isn't compromising the company producing the device, they're compromising the delivery chain which handles all (most) devices. We have substantial evidence that the NSA is doing this exactly this, in your words "compromising the company producing the device". For example in the case of RSA being paid to use Dual_EC_DRBG[1] or with the unspecified encryption chips that have been backdoored according to the Snowden documents[2]. >These two situations aren't even in the same universe. From a policy standpoint it might be the same universe. We ban the use of chemical weapons in all circumstances, despite their effectiveness, because we believe the world is a better place without them. Given the threat that hardware backdoors, either installed at the factory or during shipping, pose to both security and global trade there is an argument that such actions are off-limits. It was the public position of the US that the US did not do such actions but that China did. It appears that was PR. 1: http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/report-nsa-paid-rsa-to-make-flawed-crypto-algorithm-the-default/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/report-nsa-paid-rsa-... 2: "(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Complete enable for [REDACTED] encryption chips used in Virtual Private Network and Web encryption devices [CCP_00009]" - (U) COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS (U) SIGINT ENABLING http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?_r=2& http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-r...