If you were to install some packages on a system, would you install unsigned ones that are allowed to modify every other package, altering how other programs wo

If you were to install some packages on a system, would you install unsigned ones that are allowed to modify every other package, altering how other programs work, without confirmation? That's effectively the state of browser security right now. We must stop living in this fantasy playground of pretending no security in the browser is acceptable, because important things like passwords, PIN numbers and credit card numbers pass through it. An ability to sign (not hashes, signed) and verify JS, CSS and HTML would be a start. Once verified, a security policy* is applied further sandboxing an app so it doesn't go to shit with modifications or inappropriate introspections by injected or malicious code (while usually retaining normal things like the browser and plugins). Also reasonable limits to mark objects and parts of the DOM as only available to certain objects, not Orwellian mandates to throw webdev into chaos. This is something that would take a great deal of coordination with reluctant vendors that see change as cost, but it would be the biggest win for browser security. * Something a bazillion times easier to use than SELinux.