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Yet another in a long line of "data wonky" articles that misuse statistical data to support a position that is emotionally attractive. > Would this increase hi
by snowwrestler 13y ago
Yet another in a long line of "data wonky" articles that misuse statistical data to support a position that is emotionally attractive.
> Would this increase hijacking? Probably. But there's no reason to believe it would increase casualties from terrorist attacks overall. That's because increasing airport security just leads terrorists to direct their assaults elsewhere.
There are two huge problems with this statement.
First, you cannot draw such a causal conclusion from statistical data alone.
Second, it's pulling a subtle slight of hand--the goal of airport security is NOT to reduce terrorist casualties overall. It is to reduce violent attacks of any kind on airplanes, specifically.
At the base of this argument is an implication that terrorist attacks are zero-sum: reduce them in one place, get an equivalent more in another. But that's not how security works.
Look at it in digital terms--it would be like saying that we don't need to bother with strong passwords, because all those did was drive up the number of phishing attacks. Maybe we could just get of passwords, since the total number of intrusions would not go up. And besides, just think of all that wasted effort to create, hash, store, remember, and manage passwords.
Does that sound stupid? I hope so, because it is. But that's exactly the type of argument that this article is making.
- swalkergibson 13y agoThis is a false equivalency. There are numerous, perfectly good reasons why you should store hashed passwords in a database. Frisking Grandma is another story. Air marshals, metal detectors, and reinforced cockpit doors should be sufficient to halt the vast majority of terrorist attacks. As with any system, a determined adversary will absolutely get in. That is what makes the TSA theater.
- aroman 13y ago> This is a false equivalency. There are numerous, perfectly good reasons why you should store hashed passwords in a database. That is precisely his point. The TSA is in place not only to stop terrorist attacks (this is the false equivalency the article's author relied on), but ALSO to defend against a myriad of security risks, one of which happens to be "Terrorism".
- swalkergibson 13y agoI think that I must have misused false equivalency. My driving point is that implementing a hashing mechanism is in no way the same as TSA security theater, in theory or in practice. For instance, if 5 oz of liquid is dangerous on an airplane, why is it not dangerous in the trash can next to the security line?
- vidarh 13y agoAnd security only stops the 5oz+ liquids that people willingly disclose, or in the rare case they catch it in your bags. I regularly find I've forgotten to take out 0.5l (17oz) bottles from the bags I've passed through the x-ray machine. Nobody has ever caught it. They did, however, catch the circuitry of the blinking lights in my 4 year olds old shoes, which caused nervous looks for a few moments until one of the screeners who knew what they are looked over at the screens.
- gohrt 13y agoIt is absolutely true, that IF an attacker has the ability to attack unprotected plains and the ability to attack unprotected trains, AND the attacker is determined to attack, AND the attacker and defender basically care the same about successful plane attacks vs train attacks, THEN protecting the planes alone is useless, as it just shifts attacks to trains. For example: I think we can agree that it is pointless to put a lock on your back door, if your front door is wide open. In other words, given a budget of X, it is better spend it to raise MINIMUM(plane security, train security) then to raise MAXIMUM(plane security, train security), since the attacker will attack your minimum. This is just minimax AI theory.
- VLM 13y ago"AND the attacker and defender basically care the same about successful plane attacks vs train attacks," Can't hijack a train and knock down a skyscraper with it. At least not very well. Every once in a while a drunk or nutcase takes a train for a joyride (I come from a long line of railroadmen, I hear stories aside from whats in the paper). Most of them screw up the E-brake system but if its a former employee then the worst case is the switches get thrown to derail the engine before the lunatic hits anything. Its very expensive but not much of a big deal.
- nerfhammer 13y agoGetting offtopic, but NYC's most prolific and least dangerous train hijacker was just released again: http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/12/25/transit-impostor-arrested-29-times-released-on-parole/ http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/12/25/transit-impostor-arre...
- likeclockwork 13y agoI know it's crazy, but I've always thought the easiest way to rehabilitate this guy would be to hire him to do the job he's so obsessed with(if he's capable).
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- natrius 13y ago"Second, it's pulling a subtle slight of hand--the goal of airport security is NOT to reduce terrorist casualties overall. It is to reduce violent attacks of any kind on airplanes, specifically." Since cockpits are now near-impossible to break into, why is a violent attack on an airplane worse than a violent attack in a movie theater? Probabilistically, the expected carnage in the latter case is higher.
- snowwrestler 13y agoIf you set off a small bomb in a movie theater you will kill a few people. A small bomb on an airliner will crash it, killing everyone aboard.
- claudius 13y ago> First, you cannot draw such a causal conclusion from statistical data alone. From what else but (suitable) statistical can you draw such a conclusion? > Does that sound stupid? I hope so, because it is. Yes. > But that's exactly the type of argument that this article is making. No. The argument says that the attacks on society as a whole will likely remain constant regardless of airport security because there are many other, unsecured attack vectors. Going back to your analogy, airport security is like allowing only passphrase-secured SSH keys of 8192 bits (say), while at the same time running a telnet daemon which gives root immediately – the latter corresponding to all the unsecured roads, malls, trains, you-name-it. That is, if we don’t want to specifically protect airports but human lives, we have to consider not only the security gain from increased security in one area, but also whether this reduces the effectivity of attacks overall. If we want to protect one whole server and not just the SSH daemon, we have to consider not only making the SSH daemon as secure as possible but also all the other software running on this server – at which point we notice that it cannot be possibly feasible to secure this thing 100%, because nobody likes going through metal detectors to be allowed to leave their house.
- thaumasiotes 13y ago> the goal of airport security is NOT to reduce terrorist casualties overall. It is to reduce violent attacks of any kind on airplanes, specifically. OK, but this is an argument for throwing out airport security entirely. Is that what you meant to say? If I owned an airline, sure, I'd be all about reducing airline passenger casualties by killing non-passengers somewhere else. But there's no public interest in redirecting attacks; the public interest is in reducing them. > Look at it in digital terms--it would be like saying that we don't need to bother with strong passwords, because all those did was drive up the number of phishing attacks. > Does that sound stupid? I hope so, because it is. But that's exactly the type of argument that this article is making. The phenomenon of a counterbalancing reaction occurring when you make some change to a system is pretty general. How much of the desired effect (reduced casualties, or reduced breaches) of the change you made comes through, vs how much is eliminated by the reaction (increased effort directed to bombing theaters, or sending out phishing attacks), is an empirical matter; the fact that phishing attacks don't rise to nearly the level that password-guessing attacks were at before we started using stronger passwords (incidentally, we have weak passwords now, have always had weak passwords, and it is not generally felt that password strength is where we need to improve our online security), has no implications for the likely reaction of attacks to airport security. The "type" of the argument is fine; it's broad enough that it can work in one domain and fail in another.
- ketralnis 13y ago> But there's no public interest in redirecting attacks; the public interest is in reducing them I'm not sure that's true though. Airplanes can be used as powerful weapons. I'd rather leave the knife depot open than the nuclear power plant, even if the number of attacks remains constant.
- Guvante 13y agoAs the article says, using an airplane as a weapon is nearly impossible. You cannot get to the pilots anymore using the plans used last time, so thus the exigent danger you are speaking of is gone.
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- VLM 13y ago"the goal of airport security is" to provide security theater. It would be a heck of a lot cheaper and more effective to just play rambo movies on the inflight entertainment system.
- hrkristian 13y agoRambo screenings would likely have a better effect, myself and others often get so pumped up by action movies we're one wrong tone of voice from going postal. Hijackers wouldn't stand a chance in such an airplane.
- kybernetikos 13y ago> Does that sound stupid? I hope so, because it is. But that's exactly the type of argument that this article is making. Actually, it's not just making that argument, it's referencing studies to back it up: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/11/ http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/11/ > At the base of this argument is an implication that terrorist attacks are zero-sum: reduce them in one place, get an equivalent more in another. But that's not how security works. The analogy you give certainly does sound stupid, but nobody said that the effect was necessarily zero sum, what the sum is is in fact an empirical matter and the research was about precisely this question. Unlike passwords, it would not be all that surprising for it to be approximately zero sum in this case. Terrorists don't sit down and think 'how can I attack an airplane', they sit and think 'how can I cause maximum damage for minimum investment'. Against that kind of opponent, there's no point choosing one tactic and fortifying it beyond reason while leaving a million other options for someone pursuing a strategy of terror. The effective money is spent on identifying the criminals and countering them rather than cherry picking one or two specific techniques. You can see this in most historical counter terrorism efforts. Very occasionally, it's effective to identify point fixes for things that are low hanging fruit for terrorists. Reinforced cockpit doors almost certainly were part of that. Almost everything else that's been done on air travel since? Not so much. > Second, it's pulling a subtle slight of hand--the goal of airport security is NOT to reduce terrorist casualties overall. It is to reduce violent attacks of any kind on airplanes, specifically. That's the job of the personnel at the airports. However, we want to know whether the TSA is a program that should be funded, funded at the level it currently is, or given the powers it currently is. That is a question about the most effective way to reduce terrorist casualties overall (or arguably limited to US citizens anyway). It's no sleight of hand to be concerned about efficiency in the measures we take as a society to combat terrorism. > First, you cannot draw such a causal conclusion from statistical data alone. It's not clear to me why you think that the burden of proof lies in that direction. We have a problem - terrorism. We take some expensive measures - over the top checks at airports. It's not "data wonky" to demand that the programs we've put in place are able to produce real evidence of effectiveness.
- Aqueous 13y agoI mean, I think the point of all security is to reduce the total numbers of deaths from terrorist attacks overall, not just per means of transportation. That said, the fact of the matter is that the article doesn't back up its claim that airport security doesn't reduce terrorist casualties overall. Instead it states some bizarre equivalence between the decline in the number of hijackings (-6.9) and the increase in the number of instances of other kinds of terrorism (+6.8). But clearly other forms of terrorism do not cause nearly as much death as plane hijackings do, which for each one numbers in the hundreds, so we could be talking about an integer factor decrease in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks - 4x, 5x, 6x - by merely replacing them with other, less destructive terrorism. After all, the relative destructiveness of a plane hijacking is WHY terrorists do it at all. Suddenly airport security seems to look a lot more effective and a lot more worth it. So obviously they didn't mention casualties at all, since it would undermine the point they are trying to make. Everytime someone complains about security at the airport - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3dYS7PcAG4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3dYS7PcAG4 People are enjoying an incredible privilege being able to fly in the air.
- vidarh 13y ago> But clearly other forms of terrorism do not cause nearly as much death as plane hijackings do, which for each one numbers in the hundreds [citation needed] Some hijackings have caused deaths in the hundreds, namely 9/11 style suicide hijackings. However this is the exception. Even post-9/11. According to the list of hijackings on Wikipedia, of the 21 notable hijackinged since 2000, all the non-9/11 hijackings resulted in 5 victims killed (one accidentally when storming the plane). Note that post-9/11 there appears to have been a substantial increase in instances where the passengers have overpowered the hijackers, presumably out of fear of terrorists planning on killing them all. But overall, even including the WTC deaths, plane hijackings does not appear to have caused more than a few tens of victims on average; exclude the WTC dead, and the number is small - most hijackings in fact appears to have ended without any deaths. And few of the deaths that do happen appears to have been intended by the hijackers (many of the deaths have occurred due to crashes as a result of struggles, or when the planes get stormed by security forces).
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- chrismcb 13y agoI'm not sure what your first problem is. Are you implying that hijacking would NOT increase? Statistically speaking there have been more US hijackings before 9/11 than after. Couple that with "we are making it easier for bad guys to bring weapons on board" I think it is a reasonable assumption to say "it will PROBABLY increase hijacking" Didn't the author actually that that terrorists attacks ARE a zerosum game? (There was evidence, but the author admitted it was more anecdotal than proof) I don't think he was subtle here at all. If we ONLY had passwords because of phishing attacks, then it wouldn't be stupid to get rid of them (based on your statement) But we have passwords for other reasons. We don't have TSA for other reasons (well some people think we do, that is to find drugs)