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>I'm much more concerned about "NSA backdoor firmware", and vastly more concerned about China doing the same. No reason the 'upgrades' couldn't be firm/hardwar
by obstacle1 13y ago
>I'm much more concerned about "NSA backdoor firmware", and vastly more concerned about China doing the same.
No reason the 'upgrades' couldn't be firm/hardware. Just upthread a bunch of people complain about "customs" delays when ordering computers, one person for > 30 days. That is way, way more than enough time. Yes, easier at manufacture. No, not necessary at manufacture. Yes, possible en-route.
Also why would you be more concerned about China doing the same?
edit: and also the problem wouldn't be using the technique 'universally', as in doing it to every machine. The problem would be giving an org like the NSA full control over deciding who to target, incl. US citizens. That is, being indiscriminate in terms of completely disregarding domestic laws, protections, etc., rather than being indiscriminate in terms of spamming loaded chips in every box.
- rdl 13y agoYou might like to know that I'm giving a talk at 30c3 in about 4.5h which will specifically address this threat (using remote-verifiable seals). http://events.ccc.de/congress/2013/Fahrplan/events/5600.html http://events.ccc.de/congress/2013/Fahrplan/events/5600.html