3 ms·
The flow is not very simple, since the protocol is very complex. You are overall correct in that usually the PIN does not get sent off the card terminal (I'm no
by rcxdude 13y ago
The flow is not very simple, since the protocol is very complex. You are overall correct in that usually the PIN does not get sent off the card terminal (I'm not sure about never) What happens is that the PIN is sent to the card (usually plain-text, though it can be encrypted if card and terminal support it. An MITM attacker can downgrade this though). The card then reterns a plaintext 'yes' or 'no' to the pin being correct. If the pin is correct then it also sets a bit inside the MACed message which is sent to the banks indicating 'correct PIN entered'.
However, since the PIN is not required for all transactions, it used to be possible (and may stiil be possible on some banks) to MITM attack this exchange in order to complete a transaction which the terminal thinks was PIN authorised but the card thinks was not, and the upshot being you could enter whatever pin you wanted and the transaction would go through.
For more information, you can look up the EMV specification at http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx?id=223 http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx?id=223 (which is a huge slog to read, and there are many proprietary extensions). For the specific attack I mentioned, you can google 'chip and pin is broken'.