3 ms·
I had always assumed PINs never left the pad - for example in the UK the device appears to validate the PIN (quick) and then communicate with server (slower).
by lifeisstillgood 13y ago
I had always assumed PINs never left the pad - for example in the UK the device appears to validate the PIN (quick) and then communicate with server (slower).
I expected the PIN was encrypted on the chip, the chip told the device if I got it right and then the PIN was used similarly to a salt for the transaction authorisation .
Is there a real flow online one can read?
- Havoc 13y ago>I had always assumed PINs never left the pad The local pads say something about "offline" during that process. Thats for pin & chip ones though - with Target it sounds like the magnetic strip was copied. The local cards don't require a pin for magnetic strip swipes.
- rcxdude 13y agoThe flow is not very simple, since the protocol is very complex. You are overall correct in that usually the PIN does not get sent off the card terminal (I'm not sure about never) What happens is that the PIN is sent to the card (usually plain-text, though it can be encrypted if card and terminal support it. An MITM attacker can downgrade this though). The card then reterns a plaintext 'yes' or 'no' to the pin being correct. If the pin is correct then it also sets a bit inside the MACed message which is sent to the banks indicating 'correct PIN entered'. However, since the PIN is not required for all transactions, it used to be possible (and may stiil be possible on some banks) to MITM attack this exchange in order to complete a transaction which the terminal thinks was PIN authorised but the card thinks was not, and the upshot being you could enter whatever pin you wanted and the transaction would go through. For more information, you can look up the EMV specification at http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx?id=223 http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx?id=223 (which is a huge slog to read, and there are many proprietary extensions). For the specific attack I mentioned, you can google 'chip and pin is broken'.
- dlubarov 13y agoChip cards aren't prevalent yet in the US, so the only way to validate pins is to send them (encrypted) to the issuer.
- cynwoody 13y agoIn the US, the PIN-pad has no way to validate the PIN by itself. The PIN-pad is a separate, black-box peripheral of the POS terminal. The POS commands it to read a PIN, and, when the customer finishes entering the PIN, the PIN-pad replies to the POS with a 16-byte (IIRC) encrypted block. The clear-text PIN never leaves the PIN-pad. The POS includes the encrypted PIN-block along with the mag stripe data and other info (such as the merchant account and the amount to charge) in its charge request uploaded to the payment processor. The payment processor then decrypts the PIN as part of the process of deciding whether to approve or decline the transaction. >Is there a real flow online one can read? Google for "PIN-pad protocol" or "DUKPT" (the encryption scheme commonly used).