From the whitepaper http://okturtles.com/other/dnsnmc_okturtles_overview.pdf http://okturtles.com/other/dnsnmc_okturtles_overview.pdf "The magic doesn’t stop t

From the whitepaper http://okturtles.com/other/dnsnmc_okturtles_overview.pdf http://okturtles.com/other/dnsnmc_okturtles_overview.pdf "The magic doesn’t stop there. DNSNMC isn’t just DNS + NMC, it’s also an HTTP server. DNSNMC provides its clients with secure access to the Namecoin blockchain itself through a RESTful API." They're planning on shipping this browser extension with a hardcoded list of DNSNMC server IP addresses. Isn't that a central point of failure? (E.g. If an adversary mounts a DDoS against all servers in that list.) Adversaries wouldn't need to render the service unreachable, just slow it down to painfully-slow speeds for average users. Regular DNS is resilient to this because of its hierarchical design, but the paper seems to be proposing a flat list of DNSNMC servers that will be shipped with the extension by default. Since almost all users will stick with the defaults, subverting those servers would disrupt DNSNMC for most users. Also, it's unclear to me how users or website owners use DNSNMC's REST API to update their blockchain identity entry. Is it password-based? Like, when a user first creates a blockchain entry, do they set a password they must remember? If so, then what happens when they inevitably forget their password or someone steals it via a key logger? It needs to be changeable in case the old password is compromised, but that causes a whole bunch of problem scenarios, like an attacker steals a password then changes it, then modifies the user's blockchain entry. How does a user recover his stolen blockchain identity? Overall the whitepaper is a comprehensive survey of the current public key infrastructure landscape and embodies some interesting ideas for the future. While there are some very dubious ideas (like tackling all problems with JavaScript crypto) I'm cautiously optimistic about the overall direction this whitepaper is proposing, because something similar to this is a necessity: a distributed DNS system that doesn't rely on certificate authorities, and lets users distribute their public keys in a public way that can't be easily MITM'd. There are unsolved problems, like how users can recover a stolen identity, but this whitepaper takes care to be extremely clear that it's a work in progress, and that it's being made available to get early feedback on the design / to solicit ideas from the community. They don't pretend that they've thought of everything, which is nice. They're working on an important problem (a future in which CAs are unnecessary + giving everyone a way to distribute encryption keys tied to your public identity) so this kind of research is sorely needed, and I look forward to seeing what their next step is.