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Are there not two questions: 1) Were flaws introduced into the technology which potentially reduce the strength of the encryption? 2) Did OpenSSL know about i

Are there not two questions: 1) Were flaws introduced into the technology which potentially reduce the strength of the encryption? 2) Did OpenSSL know about it? It seems the answers can be yes and no without any real stretch. If you are, say, the NSA, asking / paying for a whole standard to be implemented (a) gets the bit you want implemented and (b) hides what you're really interested in from anyone wondering and looks less suspicious. Once it's in they could either start pushing for it to become a default, push for people to voluntarily choose it (get people speaking at conferences to recommend it or whatever), or just leave it knowing that a few people would use it and that works for them too. But the fact that OpenSSL probably weren't complicit doesn't change the fact that elements of the product need to be considered potentially flawed.

edraferi 13y ago
I'd reverse those answers, actually. 1) the mailing list post states that OpenSSL wants to be comprehensive, even when that means providing implementations of algorithms that you probably shouldn't use. The inclusion of weak, or even broken, algorithms does not undermine the product as a whole given this mission. It has no impact on the effectiveness of other, stronger algorithms in OpenSSL. 2) OpenSSL knew that one of the algorithms in the standard was weak, but thought it was still valuable to implement the standard. again, the comprehensiveness goal means it's up to the end users to utilize OpenSSL in a manner consistent with their use case.
Spooky23 13y ago
You're reading too much into this. FIPS-140 validation is required for many applications in areas like healthcare and banking. FIPS compliance is also required for most state/local government applications as well. I believe you need to be compliant with everything in the spec to be validated.

edraferi 13y ago

I'd reverse those answers, actually. 1) the mailing list post states that OpenSSL wants to be comprehensive, even when that means providing implementations of algorithms that you probably shouldn't use. The inclusion of weak, or even broken, algorithms does not undermine the product as a whole given this mission. It has no impact on the effectiveness of other, stronger algorithms in OpenSSL. 2) OpenSSL knew that one of the algorithms in the standard was weak, but thought it was still valuable to implement the standard. again, the comprehensiveness goal means it's up to the end users to utilize OpenSSL in a manner consistent with their use case.

Spooky23 13y ago

You're reading too much into this. FIPS-140 validation is required for many applications in areas like healthcare and banking. FIPS compliance is also required for most state/local government applications as well. I believe you need to be compliant with everything in the spec to be validated.