Sorry, Ed, but we are nowhere near "mission accomplished". This debate may have begun with worries about the risks posed by NSA overreach, but it does not end

Sorry, Ed, but we are nowhere near "mission accomplished". This debate may have begun with worries about the risks posed by NSA overreach, but it does not end with them. As Bruce Schneier pointed out, the tools of today's spies are the same as the tools of tomorrow's criminals. Whilst I am not exactly comfortable with the idea of persistent, intimate state surveillance, this discomfort fades into paltry insignificance when I consider the implications of criminal entities controlling the computing devices that I use to analyse and understand issues, make decisions and interact with the world. I studied Artificial Intelligence as a student. I buy (somewhat) into Kurzweil's view of the future. Today, my computer may be a "bicycle for the mind", but tomorrow, we may have difficulty distinguishing between rider and vehicle. The security of today's internet; today's computing devices, profoundly affects how securely, how effectively, and how independently I will be able to think in 20 or 30 years time. We need to start talking more (much more) about the weaknesses and security vulnerabilities inherent in the architecture and design of our public communications and computing infrastructure. This debate has to get detailed and has to get technical. Fast.