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This "explanation" is misdirection. The accusation was never that the NSA wanted to add just this one bust algorithm. The NSA, acting as a client protected by p

by alttab 13y ago

This "explanation" is misdirection. The accusation was never that the NSA wanted to add just this one bust algorithm. The NSA, acting as a client protected by privacy, could have easily invested time and money to be a significant contributor, with a small, hidden, 1 time payload.

mst 13y ago
I fail to see how it's misdirection. OpenSSL have explained, clearly, what they were paid for - and it seems entirely reasonable to implement everything, especially given - as that post shows - that the duff algorithm was really quite hard to use unless you really tried. Additionally, given the trouble Theo's got into on a number of occasions for criticisng bits of the government, it seems fairly unlikely that he would've been comfortable with the project taking NSA money. Most plausible situation: Corporation said "here's money, implement ALL the things", OpenSSL figured it was a good way to get the useful things paid for plus some stuff that potential future sponsors might find useful in marketing material. As for whether said Corporation had additional, non-obvious motives, I make no guess either way. But misdirection does not, frankly, seem appropriate to describe the explanation given, and your scare quotes suggest you're appealing to emotion rather than presenting an actual argument. Do feel free to present one if you have one, though, it's entirely possible I misunderstood.
- letstryagain 13y ago
  It's pretty obvious that the 'client' was indeed the NSA. They say they can't reveal who the client is because of the NDA. If the client was NOT the NSA they could simply say so. But they didn't...
  - maxerickson 13y ago
    I don't think you can play 20 questions and also say that you are respecting the NDA.
  - TheCondor 13y ago
    Fips certifications cost some money and openssl relies upon sponsors to do that. As I understood their explanation it was one of the fips sponsors. It had a bug anyways, nobody ever used dual ec with openssl.
  - grmarcil 13y ago
    That's not how NDAs work... usually would be a prohibition of both confirming AND/or denying anything related to the information behind the NDA.
  - crag 13y ago
    Ahhh no. Your making assumptions. It's not obvious that the client was the NSA. Why not the DOD, or CIA, or hell even SSA? Not that it matters much anyway. The result is the same.
- Tyrannosaurs 13y ago
  Are there not two questions: 1) Were flaws introduced into the technology which potentially reduce the strength of the encryption? 2) Did OpenSSL know about it? It seems the answers can be yes and no without any real stretch. If you are, say, the NSA, asking / paying for a whole standard to be implemented (a) gets the bit you want implemented and (b) hides what you're really interested in from anyone wondering and looks less suspicious. Once it's in they could either start pushing for it to become a default, push for people to voluntarily choose it (get people speaking at conferences to recommend it or whatever), or just leave it knowing that a few people would use it and that works for them too. But the fact that OpenSSL probably weren't complicit doesn't change the fact that elements of the product need to be considered potentially flawed.
  - edraferi 13y ago
    I'd reverse those answers, actually. 1) the mailing list post states that OpenSSL wants to be comprehensive, even when that means providing implementations of algorithms that you probably shouldn't use. The inclusion of weak, or even broken, algorithms does not undermine the product as a whole given this mission. It has no impact on the effectiveness of other, stronger algorithms in OpenSSL. 2) OpenSSL knew that one of the algorithms in the standard was weak, but thought it was still valuable to implement the standard. again, the comprehensiveness goal means it's up to the end users to utilize OpenSSL in a manner consistent with their use case.
  - Spooky23 13y ago
    You're reading too much into this. FIPS-140 validation is required for many applications in areas like healthcare and banking. FIPS compliance is also required for most state/local government applications as well. I believe you need to be compliant with everything in the spec to be validated.
- throwaway2048 13y ago
  theo and OpenBSD have nothing to do with OpenSSL
blazespin 13y ago
Steve Marquess, the originator of that post on nabble, is the main point of contact for OpenSSL commercial contracting. It's interesting that he used that phrasing.

by alttab 13y ago

mst 13y ago

I fail to see how it's misdirection. OpenSSL have explained, clearly, what they were paid for - and it seems entirely reasonable to implement everything, especially given - as that post shows - that the duff algorithm was really quite hard to use unless you really tried. Additionally, given the trouble Theo's got into on a number of occasions for criticisng bits of the government, it seems fairly unlikely that he would've been comfortable with the project taking NSA money. Most plausible situation: Corporation said "here's money, implement ALL the things", OpenSSL figured it was a good way to get the useful things paid for plus some stuff that potential future sponsors might find useful in marketing material. As for whether said Corporation had additional, non-obvious motives, I make no guess either way. But misdirection does not, frankly, seem appropriate to describe the explanation given, and your scare quotes suggest you're appealing to emotion rather than presenting an actual argument. Do feel free to present one if you have one, though, it's entirely possible I misunderstood.

letstryagain 13y ago
It's pretty obvious that the 'client' was indeed the NSA. They say they can't reveal who the client is because of the NDA. If the client was NOT the NSA they could simply say so. But they didn't...
- maxerickson 13y ago
  I don't think you can play 20 questions and also say that you are respecting the NDA.
- TheCondor 13y ago
  Fips certifications cost some money and openssl relies upon sponsors to do that. As I understood their explanation it was one of the fips sponsors. It had a bug anyways, nobody ever used dual ec with openssl.
- grmarcil 13y ago
  That's not how NDAs work... usually would be a prohibition of both confirming AND/or denying anything related to the information behind the NDA.
- crag 13y ago
  Ahhh no. Your making assumptions. It's not obvious that the client was the NSA. Why not the DOD, or CIA, or hell even SSA? Not that it matters much anyway. The result is the same.
Tyrannosaurs 13y ago
Are there not two questions: 1) Were flaws introduced into the technology which potentially reduce the strength of the encryption? 2) Did OpenSSL know about it? It seems the answers can be yes and no without any real stretch. If you are, say, the NSA, asking / paying for a whole standard to be implemented (a) gets the bit you want implemented and (b) hides what you're really interested in from anyone wondering and looks less suspicious. Once it's in they could either start pushing for it to become a default, push for people to voluntarily choose it (get people speaking at conferences to recommend it or whatever), or just leave it knowing that a few people would use it and that works for them too. But the fact that OpenSSL probably weren't complicit doesn't change the fact that elements of the product need to be considered potentially flawed.
- edraferi 13y ago
  I'd reverse those answers, actually. 1) the mailing list post states that OpenSSL wants to be comprehensive, even when that means providing implementations of algorithms that you probably shouldn't use. The inclusion of weak, or even broken, algorithms does not undermine the product as a whole given this mission. It has no impact on the effectiveness of other, stronger algorithms in OpenSSL. 2) OpenSSL knew that one of the algorithms in the standard was weak, but thought it was still valuable to implement the standard. again, the comprehensiveness goal means it's up to the end users to utilize OpenSSL in a manner consistent with their use case.
- Spooky23 13y ago
  You're reading too much into this. FIPS-140 validation is required for many applications in areas like healthcare and banking. FIPS compliance is also required for most state/local government applications as well. I believe you need to be compliant with everything in the spec to be validated.
throwaway2048 13y ago
theo and OpenBSD have nothing to do with OpenSSL

blazespin 13y ago

Steve Marquess, the originator of that post on nabble, is the main point of contact for OpenSSL commercial contracting. It's interesting that he used that phrasing.