Papers were published by reputable cryptographers in 2007 making it clear that a Dual EC DRBG could be backdoored by the entity that chose the points. The whol

Papers were published by reputable cryptographers in 2007 making it clear that a Dual EC DRBG could be backdoored by the entity that chose the points. The whole point is that this didn't come out of no-where. This algorithm was already regarded as being suspect, and RSA knew that they had been paid to make it the default in their cryptography library. This isn't like the DES situation, where there was never any real evidence that the changes made by the NSA had made DES weaker (and as we later found out, they'd actually made the algorithm stronger whilst at the same time ensuring that the key-space was small enough that they could crack it). RSA have seriously let down their customers & not for the first time. If I was an RSA customer I'd be taking a good hard look at dropping them as soon as I possibly could.