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pg. 30 contains what sounds like a much too broad request for any and all public and private keys for ALL lavabit users including HTTPS sessions and SMTP commun

by MWil 13y ago

pg. 30 contains what sounds like a much too broad request for any and all public and private keys for ALL lavabit users including HTTPS sessions and SMTP communications, not just Snowden Actual search warrant is much more narrow to just Snowden, although missing the date before which the warrant must be executed Served in TX on a Thursday to show up for court the next Tuesday AM in VA - gotta love that prep time!

dalke 13y ago
When it actually get to court, the judge emphasizes that only information about a specific account is needed. The judge on p115 or so emphasizes that the government can ask for that information, and it doesn't matter if it's easy or hard to access. The judge on p50, says that encryption keys must be provided in order to make sense of the legally obligated pen register data. Levinson, on p51, brought the keys with him (as you mentioned, on p30), but Levinson, on p52 points out ... well, I'm not sure. I think it's that the keys in the subpoena don't actually exist? Levinson is willing to make the pen register available, for a development fee of about $2,000 (p90). (Note: Verizon charges about $700 for 60 days of a pen trap; see https://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra_irvine7_irvineca.pdf https://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltr... . I don't find the $2,000 to be unreasonable by comparison.) The government says that paying development costs has never been done before (to the lawyer's understanding), and doesn't want to do so. (p116). On p 115, the judge says that ease or difficulty doesn't play a role on if the government is lawfully entitled to the information. (I wonder then how Verizon can charge for it.) Levinson, btw, wants to provide the data in a lump data dump, after 60 days of recording (p90). More frequent updates will cost another $1,500. The government, on the other hand, demands real-time data, and wants to install a real-time device which captures all metadata, which is then filtered so that agents only receive what's in the pen order (p121). This requires the full SSL keys. The judge agrees with the government that this is reasonable. (line 18, p121). Previously (p56), Levinson asked the court if it was possible to do an audit of the pen register. The judge responded that any request for extra monitoring would be denied. BTW, Appendix A shows a copy of the infamous SSL key as 4pt font.
- arca_vorago 13y ago
  These are the key points to me. "The government, on the other hand, demands real-time data, and wants to install a real-time device which captures all metadata, which is then filtered so that agents only receive what's in the pen order (p121). This requires the full SSL keys. The judge agrees with the government that this is reasonable. (line 18, p121). Previously (p56), Levinson asked the court if it was possible to do an audit of the pen register. The judge responded that any request for extra monitoring would be denied." Who knows what all these little black boxes do? Just because they say it will only transmit what is in the order, how can one know otherwise? Hence the request for audit, which is denied... very, very suspicious.
  - dalke 13y ago
    Agreed. There's a place there where the judge asked the lawyer for Lavabit something like "if you don't trust the government wiretap box then why should the government trust that you are providing the required information"? The lawyer had no real response, and agreed that the judge had a good point. I can think of some answers which might have been better, but they require technical collaboration to come up with a mutually acceptable answer. Or, with the Snowden information we know now, there's a reasonable suspicion that the unreviewed information might be stored for later, should the government decide there are other justifiable reasons to review it in the future.
    - MWil 13y ago
      The only answer you need is that the Constitution is simultaneously built on trust/mistrust of government. Otherwise, why bother with checks and balances.

by MWil 13y ago

dalke 13y ago

When it actually get to court, the judge emphasizes that only information about a specific account is needed. The judge on p115 or so emphasizes that the government can ask for that information, and it doesn't matter if it's easy or hard to access. The judge on p50, says that encryption keys must be provided in order to make sense of the legally obligated pen register data. Levinson, on p51, brought the keys with him (as you mentioned, on p30), but Levinson, on p52 points out ... well, I'm not sure. I think it's that the keys in the subpoena don't actually exist? Levinson is willing to make the pen register available, for a development fee of about $2,000 (p90). (Note: Verizon charges about $700 for 60 days of a pen trap; see https://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra_irvine7_irvineca.pdf https://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltr... . I don't find the $2,000 to be unreasonable by comparison.) The government says that paying development costs has never been done before (to the lawyer's understanding), and doesn't want to do so. (p116). On p 115, the judge says that ease or difficulty doesn't play a role on if the government is lawfully entitled to the information. (I wonder then how Verizon can charge for it.) Levinson, btw, wants to provide the data in a lump data dump, after 60 days of recording (p90). More frequent updates will cost another $1,500. The government, on the other hand, demands real-time data, and wants to install a real-time device which captures all metadata, which is then filtered so that agents only receive what's in the pen order (p121). This requires the full SSL keys. The judge agrees with the government that this is reasonable. (line 18, p121). Previously (p56), Levinson asked the court if it was possible to do an audit of the pen register. The judge responded that any request for extra monitoring would be denied. BTW, Appendix A shows a copy of the infamous SSL key as 4pt font.

arca_vorago 13y ago
These are the key points to me. "The government, on the other hand, demands real-time data, and wants to install a real-time device which captures all metadata, which is then filtered so that agents only receive what's in the pen order (p121). This requires the full SSL keys. The judge agrees with the government that this is reasonable. (line 18, p121). Previously (p56), Levinson asked the court if it was possible to do an audit of the pen register. The judge responded that any request for extra monitoring would be denied." Who knows what all these little black boxes do? Just because they say it will only transmit what is in the order, how can one know otherwise? Hence the request for audit, which is denied... very, very suspicious.
- dalke 13y ago
  Agreed. There's a place there where the judge asked the lawyer for Lavabit something like "if you don't trust the government wiretap box then why should the government trust that you are providing the required information"? The lawyer had no real response, and agreed that the judge had a good point. I can think of some answers which might have been better, but they require technical collaboration to come up with a mutually acceptable answer. Or, with the Snowden information we know now, there's a reasonable suspicion that the unreviewed information might be stored for later, should the government decide there are other justifiable reasons to review it in the future.
  - MWil 13y ago
    The only answer you need is that the Constitution is simultaneously built on trust/mistrust of government. Otherwise, why bother with checks and balances.