4 ms·
Using an NSA backdoored RNG is pretty redundant. A cell phone cannot be secured against NSA. They'll just activate their keylogger and grab the plaintext before
by im3w1l 13y ago
Using an NSA backdoored RNG is pretty redundant. A cell phone cannot be secured against NSA. They'll just activate their keylogger and grab the plaintext before it has even been encrypted.
- meowface 13y agoThat's making the assumption that all phones in the US have NSA keyloggers on them, which is pretty unlikely.
- Crito 13y agoThey don't need keyloggers on every phone. Having them on a wide range of people's phones (say, people involved with various Occupy stuff) is a very real possibility.
- im3w1l 13y agoWhile they probably don't have keyloggers on them from the start, it is with high probability child's play for them to push it to your phone over the air, and make your phone run it http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_syste... "What makes it even worse, is that every baseband processor inherently trusts whatever data it receives from a base station (e.g. in a cell tower). Nothing is checked, everything is automatically trusted. Lastly, the baseband processor is usually the master processor, whereas the application processor (which runs the mobile operating system) is the slave. So, we have a complete operating system, running on an ARM processor, without any exploit mitigation (or only very little of it), which automatically trusts every instruction, piece of code, or data it receives from the base station you're connected to. What could possibly go wrong? "
- derefr 13y agoYep. And you can build your own (low-power) GSM base-station: http://www.thinksmallcell.com/Technology/build-your-own-opensource-femtocell.html http://www.thinksmallcell.com/Technology/build-your-own-open... So anyone with a little time on their hands can be that "trusted party" for everyone in radio vicinity.
- conformal 13y agoconsider that every factory-default mobile OS has vendor backdoors, if not ISP, firmware and hardware backdoors. no need to keylog everyone, just remotely take over on-demand using vendor backdoor.
- conformal 13y agoding ding ding! you have won the prize! expecting anything to be secure on a mobile device is a serious mistake. in some ways, textsecure and redphone actually induce behavior that puts people at risk: no amount of encryption can make a mobile device safe. the only possible exception to this is a device that is built from zero and has fully in-house gsm stack, etc.
- svantana 13y agoThat gives me an idea: messaging apps shouldn't use the default OS keyboard, but write their own. In that case, NSA would need to target that messaging app specifically.
- conformal 13y agonot going to buy you much if an attacker has dma, which is what a proper backdoor will give.
- sillysaurus2 13y agoThe goal is to prevent mass snooping on our private data. It's impossible to prevent an attacker with root access from getting your data, but on the other hand, they must invoke their root access in order to get your data. More simply: right now, the NSA is vacuuming up everyone's data across all services. Your emails, your texts, your search history, certainly your metadata; basically everything. And the only reason it was possible for the NSA to do this to us is because security has historically been an afterthought. TextSecure is the first step toward keeping our data free from prying eyes. It prevents the NSA from having default access to our texts. If the NSA wants your data, they'll have to deliver a keylogger to your specific phone in particular. That's very different from gathering everyone's comms all the time. Telegram, on the other hand, offers no protection whatsoever against the NSA vacuuming up everything, because the NSA can simply MITM every Telegram conversation as they're initiated, just like the NSA MITM's CAs to decrypt your https traffic. In summary: if you care at all about a world in which the NSA can't sift through all of your data, then use and promote TextSecure, because TextSecure offers protection against governments. Now, I've said "NSA" about ten times here, but this is true for other governments too. Other governments have impersonated CAs, coerced CAs into issuing bogus security certificates, etc, to target people they deem to be political radicals. China tries very hard to do this. I'm sure there are plenty of governments worldwide who are all working on doing exactly this. So it's not just the NSA. It's the entire future landscape of our data privacy. If you believe you have the right to electronic privacy, then use TextSecure, and make sure everyone knows the truth: Telegram offers no such privacy.