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But obscurity isn't the enemy of secure crytpo; it's just not the solution to it. Assuming the enemy "already knows the system" is fine, but that doesn't mean o
by namuol 13y ago
But obscurity isn't the enemy of secure crytpo; it's just not the solution to it. Assuming the enemy "already knows the system" is fine, but that doesn't mean obscurity itself somehow reduces security...
I know that's not what the principal posits, but that's an attitude I frequently encounter, and I find it profoundly annoying, for some reason.
- hcarvalhoalves 13y ago> but that doesn't mean obscurity itself somehow reduces security... Banks have window facades for a reason... Transparency is also a way of increasing security. It cuts both ways. Consider a weakness in a hash algorithm. If found by a 3rd party, you want this information to be publicly announced as soon as possible (be you Alice or Chuck), but that's only possible if the algorithm is widely available in the first place.
- herbig 13y agoIf we're assuming that obscurity is close to irrelevant, what matters is that the cryptography method is sound. In which case, obscurity doesn't reduce security, but it is a waste of effort.
- citrin_ru 13y agoObscurity is enemy when there is security system vendor and consumer. If algorithms used inside is not public known, than consumer can't choose from two systems more secure one.
- mkesper 13y agoObscurity is bad because it makes you _think_ it adds security.