6 ms·
Playing loud music when encrypting/decrypting/typing in your password will defend against acoustic attacks, right? This other type of attack, however, isn't so
by sillysaurus2 13y ago
Playing loud music when encrypting/decrypting/typing in your password will defend against acoustic attacks, right?
This other type of attack, however, isn't so easily guarded against:
Beyond acoustics, we demonstrate that a similar low-bandwidth attack can be performed by measuring the electric potential of a computer chassis. A suitably-equipped attacker need merely touch the target computer with his bare hand, or get the required leakage information from the ground wires at the remote end of VGA, USB or Ethernet cables.
This serves as a reminder that it's pretty much impossible to defend against an attacker that has physical access to your box.
- kevincennis 13y ago> Playing loud music when encrypting/decrypting/typing in your password will defend against acoustic attacks, right? Probably. The answer to Q11 says "The interesting acoustic signals are mostly above 10KHz". They don't say what the high end of the range is. But I would guess that sufficiently loud music (which usually contains frequencies up to about 22kHz) would mask the sound generated by the CPU.
- pbsd 13y agoFrom the article: Noisy environment. One may expect that placing the machine in a noisy machine will foil the attack. However, the energy of noise generated in a typical noisy environment (such as outdoors or a noisy room) is typically concentrated at low frequencies, below 10kHz. Since the acoustic leakage is usually present well above this rage, such noises can be easily filtered out during the data acquisition process using a suitable high-pass filter (as we did in our experiments). Also, the signal would be observe during any pauses in ambient noise (e.g., music). Note also that the attacker may, to some extent, spectrally shift the acoustic signal to a convenient notch in the noise profile, by inducing other load on the machine (see below). Thus, a carefully-designed acoustic noise generator would be required for masking the leakage.
- kubiiii 13y ago"Thus, a carefully-designed acoustic noise generator would be required for masking the leakage." Like dubstep.
- sliverstorm 13y agoEDM to save the world (by blocking government snooping)! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Da4V5vKcGl8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Da4V5vKcGl8
- kubiiii 13y agoThey have an electribe ER1 and they modulate so that's gold.
- sliverstorm 13y agoof COURSE we can f@cking modulate this
- kevincennis 13y agoI saw that too, but I think they sort of side-step the issue of music. The bit about noise typically being below 10kHz doesn't really apply to most music. If you go run pretty much any modern record through a spectrum analyser, you'll see tons of content above 10kHz. Anyway, I'm certainly not claiming to know with any certainty that loud music would work as a preventative measure against this kind of attack. I just don't think the paper sufficiently proves that it wouldn't be.
- JonnieCache 13y agoThis is complicated by the human ear's variation in loudness perception over the frequency spectrum, and the effect this has on music. The stuff over 10k is typically mixed quieter than the stuff under 10k, though it doesn't sound that way. Records with lots of energy above 12-13khz tend to sound pretty awful. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal-loudness_contours https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal-loudness_contours EDIT: also pitch is logarithmic with respect to frequency. 8khz sounds really high pitched.
- dfox 13y agoIn my opinion, changing software in response to emissions (be it audio or EMI/RFI) and power side-channel attacks is mostly futile and correct solution involves just making sure by means of physical security and/or shielding that attacker cannot access places where it's possible to implement such attacks. On the other hand timing attacks are something that anyone implementing anything security related has to be aware of and actively prevent as they can be conducted from mostly anywhere. On the other hand measurement of potential on chassis seems interesting as that can possibly be measured pretty far away (eg. PC -> STP cable -> Cable modem -> CATV).
- shabble 13y agoAh, the Maginot Line[1] argument. Given the sheer number of possible emissions channels, are you proposing they all be universally protected against in hardware? Or that there should be special classes of 'protected against $FOO' hardware for specific threats? The concept of defence-in-depth suggests that you should take all[2] possible measures to avoid sensitive data leakage. If an attacker does get into your secret computer-bunker, but can't get past the cage or case-level defences, they could potentially still use such an attack as this. Also, how do you test that your shielding is working? The paper notes that their probable noise source was a faulty electrolytic capacitor, which presumably wasn't [as] faulty when QA'd at the factory. So you'd need to periodically retest, which could get pricey fast. Likewise, the engineering tradeoffs of shielding everything make it pretty impractical for mobile/portable devices, or ones that might be used in unsecured areas. The main issue I see is that if this (or similar improvements) is truly something that could be implemented with a mobile phone or small MEMS microphone bug in the general vicinity, it's potentially cheap enough to make it not just a "how do I protect against the NSA?" problem, but one within the means of corporate or organised crime espionage groups. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line [2] well, as many as economically feasible anyway.
- sneak 13y ago> and correct solution involves just making sure by means of physical security and/or shielding that attacker cannot access places where it's possible to implement such attacks This is addressed in the linked page.
- hawkharris 13y agoPlaying loud music when encrypting/decrypting/typing in your password will defend against acoustic attacks, right? I recommend "Wrecking Ball" by Miley Cyrus. The strength of the attacker's cryptanalysis will be moot because no one will go near you.
- mathgladiator 13y agoor... it may increase people's interest in you, you know, for national security.
- hawkharris 13y agoWell, by Bradley Manning's account, he listened to Lady Gaga while leaking classified military documents, so maybe hit pop songs are not as innocent as they seem. :)
- BrandonMarc 13y ago"Puberty Love" can be an ... um ... lethal option, too. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_of_the_Killer_Tomatoes http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_of_the_Killer_Tomatoes
- venomsnake 13y agoIt won't - you find the tracks with shazam and then just subtract them from the recording.
- hosh 13y agoSo a scenario would be what, when two people bring their laptops to do a deal via Bitcoin?
- tedunangst 13y agoThe attack requires the victim to encrypt/decrypt many chosen messages, no? Configure your laptop to only encrypt or decrypt messages when you want it to.
- ams6110 13y agoSome people have GPG configured to sign every email they send. Would that be enough activity to compromise the key?
- tedunangst 13y agoNot if the attacker doesn't control the contents. They would need to send you the email, and then you would need to open/decrypt it while they're listening. afaik.
- lhgaghl 13y agoUhh... When people say physical access to your box, they mean someone can physically tamper with it in arbitrary ways. This is not the same as being near the box. Otherwise we would just say that all phones/laptops are insecure.
- BrandonMarc 13y agoThis serves as a reminder that it's pretty much impossible to defend against an attacker that has physical access to your box. ... or is able to hack into your phone.