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> You could theoretically add all sorts of controls and access-limitations. There's really zero benefit to doing so. Wow. That, right there, is the problem. Yo
by modeless 13y ago
> You could theoretically add all sorts of controls and access-limitations. There's really zero benefit to doing so.
Wow. That, right there, is the problem. You don't have to care about other people's privacy, so you don't. You're not accountable, and neither are the companies you work for.
I hope there's a disgruntled insider at one of the companies that uses your tools, and they vacuum up all the data they can find and leak it. Maybe a public scandal could make you care, if it affected your bottom line.
- Aloha 13y agoHave you ever worked in a support role?
- MichaelGG 13y agoHah. I don't mean to be condescending, but the security in telecom is laughable. I've tested nearly a dozen systems and networks, and in every case never had to spend more than a day getting root. (I'm sure there are decently designed ones, but that's not the common case.) I had the CTO of one of the major switch vendors tell me that "buffer overflows aren't a problem, unless maybe the network is very fast". This is a company that markets an edge device with security being one of the main bullet points. Not to mention, I'm willing to bet in many datacenters, you could literally just walk in and take disks out of machines. If they've got RAID and no alarming on RAID (not too uncommon) no one will even notice. Sure, some places have solid cages or require escorts. But a lot of colo space is relatively unmonitored and so long you look like you belong there and get past perimeter security (as easy as renting 1U in the same place, often) you're totally in. And the sad part? To my knowledge, these attacks aren't that widespread. Why? Because there's even lower-hanging fruit that's more lucrative to hackers. Anyways, to your point: How would this access control work? How are you going to verify a CSR actually got a call from a specific customer? How much effort are you going to put in verifying that data? This is an industry where tons of money is charged and moved around based purely on emails received, with zero verification. Also remember that full wiretap capabilities are a federal requirement (CALEA). So somewhere, they'll have a system that can turn on lawful intercept. That avenue is probably ripe for abuse. You're right in your overall sentiment. The FCC and federal government should enact privacy laws and force companies to internalize this externality. Until they do, there's little reason to make it any more difficult for support to do their job.
- Aloha 13y agoReminds me of a linux based edge router/SIP ALG product we used at a former employer if you put it on a 20 meg or faster symmetrical pipe, it would fall over, and eventually hardlock. Bugs in the drivers and a lack of hardware acceleration for the ethernet cards.
- MichaelGG 13y agoA popular ISP in one country shipped default DSL modem/routers with a SIP ALG on that didn't work. But not just the normal "totally screwing SIP up" but the alarm light would go on and the modem would be dead until power reset. On any SIP packet. This was over 6 years ago, but I think it was a ZyXEL.
- Aloha 13y agothe ZyXEL Modems were horrible in general. My preference was to use an Innoband 8012 and let the customer get their own router.