3 ms·

> That said, "US selectors" shouldn't return the results that they do in the first place. Determining if a "selector" is tied to a U.S. person is actually a ve

> That said, "US selectors" shouldn't return the results that they do in the first place. Determining if a "selector" is tied to a U.S. person is actually a very subtle and very hard problem. Let's take a phone number +1 (212) 555-1234 Is this a US selector? It's a selector for a phone in the US, but that's not the same thing as a phone number tied to a US citizen. Let's say I'm following a senior North African pirate with a Maltese mobile +356 2010-1234 and he calls/is called by my number above? - Should I follow it? Or is it absolutely off limits for me because it happens to be a U.S. number? - How do I determine if it's tied to a U.S. person? - What if it's a shared number between a group of associates, all of whom are not U.S. persons except for one? - Is that number off limits now? - If it is a U.S. person what should I do with it? - Pretend it doesn't exist? Turn it over to U.S. Federal law enforcement? Who should I turn it over to? DEA? FBI? ATF? DHS? The Coast Guard? U.S. Customs and Border Patrol? It's actually a significant intelligence task to figure this out.

rl3 13y ago
I agree completely. However, my statement was not intended to be read in isolation, but in context of "domestic collection programs that intentionally capture the full contents of nearly all domestic communications within the United States." I was referring to the bulk interception and subsequent long-term retention of data on US persons. The implication of my statement was: assuming this type of collection didn't exist, selectors related to potential US persons (for whatever reason) would simply return intercept data beginning from the time said selector was invoked. Contrast that to the present, where selectors are capable of retroactively returning the sum total of a US person's digital (and by some extension physical) life for the past 5+ years. It's commendable that the procedures for accessing the data of potential US persons are so stringent, but at the end of the day there is still an incredibly intimate and detailed picture of almost every single US citizen's private life being retained on a long-term basis.

rl3 13y ago

I agree completely. However, my statement was not intended to be read in isolation, but in context of "domestic collection programs that intentionally capture the full contents of nearly all domestic communications within the United States." I was referring to the bulk interception and subsequent long-term retention of data on US persons. The implication of my statement was: assuming this type of collection didn't exist, selectors related to potential US persons (for whatever reason) would simply return intercept data beginning from the time said selector was invoked. Contrast that to the present, where selectors are capable of retroactively returning the sum total of a US person's digital (and by some extension physical) life for the past 5+ years. It's commendable that the procedures for accessing the data of potential US persons are so stringent, but at the end of the day there is still an incredibly intimate and detailed picture of almost every single US citizen's private life being retained on a long-term basis.