3 ms·
Actually, yeah, it will be cracked, by someone. And E-Mail-addresses aren't passwords; trying a few hundred variations for each firstname for each lastname is
by Sae5waip 13y ago
Actually, yeah, it will be cracked, by someone.
And E-Mail-addresses aren't passwords; trying a few hundred variations for each firstname for each lastname is perfectly feasible and should crack a nice percentage of these hashes.
- hrrsn 13y agoMy email is firstname@companyname.co.nz (I have a few of these at different companies). I'm fairly confident this isn't going to be cracked any time soon by random MD5 hashing. (of course, my real name can be extrapolated from my HN username)
- rmc 13y agoHow many *.co.nz's are there? 1,000,000? 10,000? How many first names are there? People can generate millions of MD5's per second now-a-days.
- Jakob 13y agoThe rainbow table would just need to include alphanumeric letters + '@' for up to 30 letters. I think your emails are in nearly every rainbow table in existence.
- aparadja 13y agoJust the 1-10 character lowercase alphanumeric rainbow table from freerainbowtables.com is 297 GB. Of course, you can generate rainbow tables with various parameters and tradeoffs so it's not trivial to compare them. Still, I don't think I've ever had a rainbow table that contained plaintexts longer than 12 characters. Are 30+ length tables common these days?
- Jakob 13y agoEDIT: “nearly any email rainbow table”, i.e. 1-10 characters cross joined with all domains for a given tld. You’re correct that brute force with an entropy of 3 per bit would still be too big for rainbow table usage (like 10^15 PB too big).
- darkarmani 13y agoUsing MD5 means that CPU/GPU is cheaper/easier than a rainbow table. Or you can use both. Generate 33.1B hashes/s and start with a rainbow table.
- patio11 13y agoGiven 10^6 possible first names (that's really generous but, hey, I like my dictionaries to be cosmopolitan in character) and 10^6 domains (again, generous) exhaustive search takes 10^12 hashes. My laptop can do 10^7 in a second. This means you have about 10^5 seconds until your email is broken given that the MD5 hash is divulged. That's plus or minus three hours. Your call on whether "An adversary can only defeat my security given three hours and a hardware investment of $1,600 2010 dollars" is an acceptable security bound for your users. If it isn't, don't use MD5 for crypto purposes.
- yeukhon 13y agoThey are after a specific list of politicians which the email addresses are probably known already. So there is no security. Hashing and hashing with salt only protects population, not individual with knowledge.
- wglb 13y ago$500 graphics cards can run a dictionary against a md5 hash at the rate of 700,000,000 per second. That is 0.7 billion per second.