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I can understand why a lazy admin might want this, but why on earth would browser vendors permit CAs to issue such certificates? Surely it makes a joke of the e
by michaelt 13y ago
I can understand why a lazy admin might want this, but why on earth would browser vendors permit CAs to issue such certificates? Surely it makes a joke of the entire security model?
- rmoriz 13y agoX.509 has a top-down security model, which has benefits in authoritative deployment scenarios but is also vulnerable to things like seen today. Chrome's ca-chain pinning is only available for a selected group of sites, e.g. google, twitter, tor2web while everyone can get their properties into the HSTS list (doesn't help if any CA goes bad). This hard-coded, limited list does not scale. We need a bottom-up model, that allows something like pinning or "per-certificate" trust instead of recursive CA trust. This should not only work for things like TLS but also for S/MIME. In addition, OS and browser vendors should ask the user before some certs are trusted or at least make it very easy to untrust a lot. On OS X it's a PITA to double click every CA cert and untrust it manually.
- tedunangst 13y agoThe CAs are not telling the browser vendors that they are doing this. When they get caught, "our investigation reveals that internal procedures and safety protocols had not been followed. oops."