4 ms·
The very rigid picture of language described here and used in this and many other lesswrong essays might be compared to early Wittgenstein (Tractatus), to be co
by scythe 13y ago
The very rigid picture of language described here and used in this and many other lesswrong essays might be compared to early Wittgenstein (Tractatus), to be contrasted with later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations), alongside Derrida and a litany of less famous philosophers.
Of course, the reason Wittgenstein ultimately rejected this picture, as in rejected describing the meaning of words by formal definition, is that it doesn't accurately describe the way language is used in practice, and leads us to misunderstand situations.
"Does a tree falling in the forest make a sound?"
Albert: "no" => "Berkeleyan idealism makes sense"
Barry: "yes => "I refute it thus!" kicks rock
Of course, the question of course, is do we really want to understand the situation, or beleaguer Albert and Barry until they stop bothering us? The argumentum ad nauseum on lesswrong, by now an encyclopedia-sized blog, hints toward the latter. And there are plenty of bare, wrong assertions:
>Most philosophers would advise Albert and Barry to try to define exactly what they mean by "free will", on which topic they will certainly be able to discourse at great length.
"Most philosophers" probably wouldn't, unless you're at a conference of the Vienna circle. Philosophy admits a great many ways of approaching these questions.
If a tree is in a forest and nobody can ever hear or see it, is it really a "tree"? Is it in a "forest"? And can it really "fall"? After all, all of the trees and forests and falling we refer to in natural language (this is an empirical claim) are ultimately derived from (this is actually a propter hoc fallacy, but that's inevitable) our real experiences of trees and forests, in which falling makes a sound (this is not a definition, but a description). This is a sort of lame analysis, but at least I'm not trying to dodge the question.
- Symmetry 13y agoI think the author agrees with you about language (see [1] for example), but it seems to work pedagogically in this case. [1]http://lesswrong.com/lw/nn/neural_categories/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/nn/neural_categories/
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- TylerJay 13y ago> Of course, the reason Wittgenstein ultimately rejected this picture, as in rejected describing the meaning of words by formal definition, is that it doesn't accurately describe the way language is used in practice, and leads us to misunderstand situations. I don't think the author is really trying to give a "formal definition" of the meaning of words. The point he is trying to make is that while people may claim to disagree about a high level sentence like "when a tree falls and nobody is around to hear it, does it still makes a sound?", they actually don't expect there to be any real difference in the physical state of the world after the tree falls. If you taboo the word "sound", then the question becomes either "when a tree falls and nobody is around to hear it, are there still vibrations in the air?" or "when a tree falls and nobody is around to hear it, is there still an auditory experience for anyone?" If two people were to disagree on either of THESE statements, then they actually have an important difference in their models of the world. The idea is that words are just convenient ways of referring to a collection of objects that are similar in some ways. Words used in everyday conversation generally do not have strict definitions. They just refer to a cluster of things. This post helps explain that idea: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nl/the_cluster_structure_of_thingspace/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/nl/the_cluster_structure_of_thingspa...
- denom 13y agoHow are arguments structured? Which words are meaningless? Who is in a position of authority to determine which words need tabooing? The author's unfortunate choice of the word "Taboo" to describe this procedure of clarifying meaning reflects an implied ideological stance. He takes the role of a curator, the vanguard of the "rationalist virtue of empiricism". It's much like Richard Dawkins and others who adopt positions as the only sane ones in the room, the only ones who can isolate the _real_ parts of scientific rationality.
- daveid 13y agoThe author's choice of the word "Taboo" refers to the game called "Taboo" described in the first paragraph. It does not imply any special ideological stance.