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This is an impressive service (the speed, especially)...collation of different data sources into one easily accessible form is a hugely useful and underrated se
by danso 13y ago
This is an impressive service (the speed, especially)...collation of different data sources into one easily accessible form is a hugely useful and underrated service. That said...there's no such thing as better security without an equal tradeoff. Here, it's now much easier (especially with the site response speed) for a third party to look up email addresses, see who they've patronized, and aggregate them into a database of less noble intent.
To check if a given email address was an Adobe/Gawker/whatever customer, you would've not only had to query every separate form but you would also not be guaranteed to get a definitive response (because some services will be ambiguous to whether you got a password wrong or whether the account exists at all). With the OP's service, with positive hits, you not only get confirmation of patronage, but knowledge that they are vulnerable, even if in a small, outdated way.
It's likely something Troy has anticipated but didn't want to outright say...In the end, knowledge is better than ignorance, and the correct response is for more rapid response to hacked victims and better security awareness. But I also wonder if there's a way to provide the OP's service with more (beneficial) obfuscation?
- ericlewis 13y agoWhoa, slow your roll buddy. This could be really easily done by preprocessing the data and creating simple objects in redis. One object = email, sub objects of email could just be flags for the service it's on.
- danso 13y agoIt's not the processing that's the bottleneck, it's the gathering and the initiative to do that gathering which is rare. For example, criminal records and notices have always been collectable and, once collectable, searchable. But the incidence of "a prospective employer googled me and found a 5 year old article of me publicly urinating in college" became more of an issue in the age of Google. This isn't an indictment of Troy at all, just an observation (and I'm also just curious about what mitigation could be done, if any, that wouldn't severely inconvenience the end user). The security that exposed people had was security through obscurity, which is in the end, not enough security.
- icebraining 13y agoMitigation would be fairly simple: instead of a web form, put up an email address that you can send a message to and get back the result.
- socillion 13y agoI disagree with your thesis; anyone with malicious intent can be assumed to already have their own copy. Even the Adobe dump is under 4gb compressed - a trivial amount of storage. Additionally, there is a huge long tail of publicly available user databases that are not included in this site, which along with the lack of hashes makes it worthless for the purpose you envision. It's also extremely easy to tell if an email is registered on a website if you aren't concerned about the victim being notified. You just need to attempt to either reset the password (it'll say whether the email exists) or register a new account with their email.