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If HBO want to encrypt stuff on a system they own, or transmit it encrypted, that's their business. However, a computer system should always serve the owner. An

If HBO want to encrypt stuff on a system they own, or transmit it encrypted, that's their business. However, a computer system should always serve the owner. And the only way you can do effective DRM; leaving it viewable to me but only under your conditions; is through subverting my computer from my control - otherwise I'll just be able to read the key. DRM constitutes an attack on the loyal functioning of someone else's machine, in a way that the owner of that machine is not meant to counteract. Which is distinct from just having an encrypted file, which represents no such compromise to the loyalty expected of the computer it happens to be on at any particular time, (indeed encryption sort of assumes that it'll end up on an unfriendly machine in some form or another, else there'd be no point.)

downer94 13y ago
I agree. In that scenario, I feel absolutely no need for restraint in attacking someone else's encrypted information. Namely, when that someone else is an uninvited eavesdropper. I refuse to tolerate the idea of placing a high-powered machine in my living room, if that machine won't tell me what it's doing or who it's talking to. In that moment I feel completely justified in my attempts to break encryption, read the information collected about me, and reverse engineer or destroy the device. This is an aspect that OP's article doesn't cover: Consumer products bundled with mandated encryption that operates against the interest of the end user, with designs to eavesdrop on the user simply to capture their ambient behavior as a rule, and disinform the user of the information collected about them, whether it be accelerometer information, GPS information, or channel changing habits. This is the inverse of Phil Zimmerman's goal. Pervasive, continuous observation and telemetry, especially that which occurs without the consent or awareness of the observed.

downer94 13y ago

I agree. In that scenario, I feel absolutely no need for restraint in attacking someone else's encrypted information. Namely, when that someone else is an uninvited eavesdropper. I refuse to tolerate the idea of placing a high-powered machine in my living room, if that machine won't tell me what it's doing or who it's talking to. In that moment I feel completely justified in my attempts to break encryption, read the information collected about me, and reverse engineer or destroy the device. This is an aspect that OP's article doesn't cover: Consumer products bundled with mandated encryption that operates against the interest of the end user, with designs to eavesdrop on the user simply to capture their ambient behavior as a rule, and disinform the user of the information collected about them, whether it be accelerometer information, GPS information, or channel changing habits. This is the inverse of Phil Zimmerman's goal. Pervasive, continuous observation and telemetry, especially that which occurs without the consent or awareness of the observed.