7 ms·

What's worse? 1) Being the party/person who started another world war; 2) Being nuked without ability to retaliate (in case the executive branch is wiped out)

What's worse? 1) Being the party/person who started another world war; 2) Being nuked without ability to retaliate (in case the executive branch is wiped out) Most incredibly stupid decisions were made rationally, under extreme perception of the reality.

kken 13y ago
Your primal senses probably tell you that 1) is the best option, but objectively seen it's 2).
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- 6d0debc071 13y ago
  How so? If we're nuked, we're nuked. The thing is that the other side believes we can nuke them back so they don't do it in the first place. If it's all in the air, I don't see what we stand to gain.
  - nickff 13y ago
    You are assuming there is no possibility of a third-strike, which may or may not be the case.
    - 6d0debc071 13y ago
      If they were prepared to launch a third strike, why would they wait for your second strike to do it, rather than just going all in at the outset? I can't think of anything sufficiently valuable that you could offer them in surrender to offset the probability of your launching a second strike and the resultant loss on their part. If they thought they could deliver a knock-out blow to the majority of your arsenal, they'd do it. The real question, I feel, is more to do with what the window for that blow would be: Can they achieve sufficient synchronism across their various platforms that the bombs will all arrive at more or less the same time - preventing the destruction of some components of the system from warning others? Can they avoid your long range systems picking up their launches several minutes out? Is the window, from detection to response, in other words, small enough that they can hit you fast enough that you don't have time to respond? In that arena I don't think a few seconds one way or the other, to input a more complex launch code, would make much difference. It seems to me like if they can get close enough not to be picked up at long range, if they can launch with synchronous on target timing, then they should overshoot your response time by a long way. And if they can't, then they shouldn't come anywhere near it.
      - nickff 13y ago
        1) Not all weapons systems are kept on 15 minute alert, so those cannot be launched immediately, including some sheltered bombers and mobile missile launchers. Other weapons systems, such as the Soviet (NATO reporting name) "typhoon" class submarines are purposely built to ensure that the enemy will not be able to rebuild. 2) A first strike may be intended to decapitate the leadership, decimate the enemy nuclear capabilities, destroy the entire army, or obliterate the whole country; the same goes for a second or third strike. It should also be noted that the Soviets implemented the "dead-hand" system so that any surviving installations would automatically retaliate even in the event of a successful first strike. 3) There are a variety of first strike scenarios, mostly involving SSBNs near the enemy coast, and stealth bombers since late in the cold war, as they give the shortest response window. Synchronizing a first strike would likely only be between one type of platform (i.e. all stealth bombers or SSBNs launching simultaneously); which is not too challenging. 4) First strike requires less than 15 minutes of notice, though even this may be too much. Soviets feared that the stealth bombers or a missile shield would encourage an American first strike exactly because the first would provide no response window, and the second would make any response futile. 5) Above. 6) Maybe. This all misses the basic point, which is that MAD made nuclear strikes even more pointless than they had previously been. Simply put, what is the point of destroying the enemy, and irradiating their territory (especially their most valuable assets) with a strike? Why would you put yourself at risk to achieve a goal of no benefit to you, except relieving paranoia, under MAD?
sbarre 13y ago
Definitely #1
BenderV 13y ago
Well easy, it's 1)... But thinking that there was only two viable options is stupid. (less stupid than create a password so simple for such a powerful stuff...) Though, you are right about the danger of the perception of reality. (that why it's good, some time, to go back to the first principles)
JulianMorrison 13y ago
A nuclear explosion is a disaster; a nuclear war is a species extinction event. I pick "nuke me".
rdtsc 13y ago
That why Russians created http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war) Its purpose was to actually two fold -- ensure the ability to launch a retaliatory attack after a "surgical" nuclear strike and (and this follows from the first) ensure that hot headed generals or future leadership wouldn't be too quick to press the trigger on the very first warning (which might be a false alarm, and these have happened in the past). That is a pretty nice system come to think about it. So on first ever threat the #1 thing to do is enable this system. Then decide what to do, knowing, it would be possible to retaliate. Note, what is interesting, they didn't broadcast to the world that they had it. Which is interesting. From a game-theoretic point of view, shouldn't they have broadcasted its existence as that would have discouraged a first strike?
- ceejayoz 13y ago
  What's the point announcing it to the world? They only needed NATO higher-ups to know it existed, which is pretty likely given the state of Cold War espionage.
  - rdtsc 13y ago
    That's what I meant by the "world" -- the adversary, not everyone on the street. How could they be sure that NATO leadership knew though. Feed it to a double agent?
    - Coffeewine 13y ago
      Pick up the famous Moscow-Washington hotline and simply tell them.
      - rdtsc 13y ago
        The publicly released statements, from defectors and others, these many years after seem to indicate they haven't done that. I certainly don't know the truth but it would seem they would want to make sure to let the other side know unambiguously that this exists and that it works well. (Now maybe I am missing a part of the strategy that discourages this?).
fela 13y ago
1. No appropriate locking doesn't necessarily mean a world war will get triggered, but it might happen, and it would be a very bad thing, specially if it could be avoided, that your party started would hardly be of any consolation. 2. A locking system in place does not make much of a difference if there is no war, and much of the deterrent factor would probably still be there. If there is a nuclear attack, well, even if you are able to respond things will look quite grim, so it doesn't really make such a great difference (and it has to be seen how easy it is for your opponent to block retaliation).

kken 13y ago

Your primal senses probably tell you that 1) is the best option, but objectively seen it's 2).

deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
6d0debc071 13y ago
How so? If we're nuked, we're nuked. The thing is that the other side believes we can nuke them back so they don't do it in the first place. If it's all in the air, I don't see what we stand to gain.
- nickff 13y ago
  You are assuming there is no possibility of a third-strike, which may or may not be the case.
  - 6d0debc071 13y ago
    If they were prepared to launch a third strike, why would they wait for your second strike to do it, rather than just going all in at the outset? I can't think of anything sufficiently valuable that you could offer them in surrender to offset the probability of your launching a second strike and the resultant loss on their part. If they thought they could deliver a knock-out blow to the majority of your arsenal, they'd do it. The real question, I feel, is more to do with what the window for that blow would be: Can they achieve sufficient synchronism across their various platforms that the bombs will all arrive at more or less the same time - preventing the destruction of some components of the system from warning others? Can they avoid your long range systems picking up their launches several minutes out? Is the window, from detection to response, in other words, small enough that they can hit you fast enough that you don't have time to respond? In that arena I don't think a few seconds one way or the other, to input a more complex launch code, would make much difference. It seems to me like if they can get close enough not to be picked up at long range, if they can launch with synchronous on target timing, then they should overshoot your response time by a long way. And if they can't, then they shouldn't come anywhere near it.
    - nickff 13y ago
      1) Not all weapons systems are kept on 15 minute alert, so those cannot be launched immediately, including some sheltered bombers and mobile missile launchers. Other weapons systems, such as the Soviet (NATO reporting name) "typhoon" class submarines are purposely built to ensure that the enemy will not be able to rebuild. 2) A first strike may be intended to decapitate the leadership, decimate the enemy nuclear capabilities, destroy the entire army, or obliterate the whole country; the same goes for a second or third strike. It should also be noted that the Soviets implemented the "dead-hand" system so that any surviving installations would automatically retaliate even in the event of a successful first strike. 3) There are a variety of first strike scenarios, mostly involving SSBNs near the enemy coast, and stealth bombers since late in the cold war, as they give the shortest response window. Synchronizing a first strike would likely only be between one type of platform (i.e. all stealth bombers or SSBNs launching simultaneously); which is not too challenging. 4) First strike requires less than 15 minutes of notice, though even this may be too much. Soviets feared that the stealth bombers or a missile shield would encourage an American first strike exactly because the first would provide no response window, and the second would make any response futile. 5) Above. 6) Maybe. This all misses the basic point, which is that MAD made nuclear strikes even more pointless than they had previously been. Simply put, what is the point of destroying the enemy, and irradiating their territory (especially their most valuable assets) with a strike? Why would you put yourself at risk to achieve a goal of no benefit to you, except relieving paranoia, under MAD?

sbarre 13y ago

Definitely #1

BenderV 13y ago

Well easy, it's 1)... But thinking that there was only two viable options is stupid. (less stupid than create a password so simple for such a powerful stuff...) Though, you are right about the danger of the perception of reality. (that why it's good, some time, to go back to the first principles)

JulianMorrison 13y ago

A nuclear explosion is a disaster; a nuclear war is a species extinction event. I pick "nuke me".

rdtsc 13y ago

That why Russians created http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war) Its purpose was to actually two fold -- ensure the ability to launch a retaliatory attack after a "surgical" nuclear strike and (and this follows from the first) ensure that hot headed generals or future leadership wouldn't be too quick to press the trigger on the very first warning (which might be a false alarm, and these have happened in the past). That is a pretty nice system come to think about it. So on first ever threat the #1 thing to do is enable this system. Then decide what to do, knowing, it would be possible to retaliate. Note, what is interesting, they didn't broadcast to the world that they had it. Which is interesting. From a game-theoretic point of view, shouldn't they have broadcasted its existence as that would have discouraged a first strike?

ceejayoz 13y ago
What's the point announcing it to the world? They only needed NATO higher-ups to know it existed, which is pretty likely given the state of Cold War espionage.
- rdtsc 13y ago
  That's what I meant by the "world" -- the adversary, not everyone on the street. How could they be sure that NATO leadership knew though. Feed it to a double agent?
  - Coffeewine 13y ago
    Pick up the famous Moscow-Washington hotline and simply tell them.
    - rdtsc 13y ago
      The publicly released statements, from defectors and others, these many years after seem to indicate they haven't done that. I certainly don't know the truth but it would seem they would want to make sure to let the other side know unambiguously that this exists and that it works well. (Now maybe I am missing a part of the strategy that discourages this?).

fela 13y ago

1. No appropriate locking doesn't necessarily mean a world war will get triggered, but it might happen, and it would be a very bad thing, specially if it could be avoided, that your party started would hardly be of any consolation. 2. A locking system in place does not make much of a difference if there is no war, and much of the deterrent factor would probably still be there. If there is a nuclear attack, well, even if you are able to respond things will look quite grim, so it doesn't really make such a great difference (and it has to be seen how easy it is for your opponent to block retaliation).