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Although the ipv6 addresses are all technically globally routable, my (ISP-provided) router defaults to not routing new incoming connections through to addresse
by mappu 13y ago
Although the ipv6 addresses are all technically globally routable, my (ISP-provided) router defaults to not routing new incoming connections through to addresses on the LAN. Outgoing TCP connections work fine. So in effect you get the same security as NAT.
- simoncion 13y agoThat's (IMO) pretty terrible default behavior. 1) Is it easy for a somewhat technical person to change? 2) If you don't mind telling, who's your ISP?
- mappu 13y agoIt's definitely not ideal (blocking end-to-end routing defeats a lot of the point of IPv6) but i understand the security POV. It is straightforward to change, about the same complexity as forwarding a port was on IPv4 (click around in web ui for a minute or two). The router is an AVM FritzBox 7340, the ISP is Snap (New Zealand). I have no idea if this setting is common or not for IPv6 deployments.
- simoncion 13y agoThank you very much for the information. I, too understand why that would be the default configuration. It's very good to hear that it's not a pain to change. Do you know if you can set that FritzBox up to just act as a DSL->Ethernet bridge and pass through packets to another device that does all the routing? (Sorry if that doesn't make sense. I'm not a professional network nerd, so my terminology might be confused.)
- wmf 13y agoThere's an IETF standard that says IPv6 home routers should have a default deny firewall. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6092#page-15 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6092#page-15 Some people are trying to get it changed: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-v6ops-vyncke-balanced-ipv6-security-01#section-3.1 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-v6ops-vyncke-balanced-ipv6-...
- simoncion 13y agoBoth of those are Informational documents, not Standards. :) Documents like this one are Standards: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616 Given the quality of MSFT's and Apple's firewalls, and the ease of use of MSFT's (I assume Apple's is easy to use, but I have no direct experience), I cannot agree that a default DENY firewall policy is a good default configuration. We'd be back in the world where consumers would need something uPnP to manage firewall rules on their router. I can agree that refusing to route requests to things like port 445/tcp is reasonable.