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I think that approach was taken by some prior IPsec implementations. I recall that John Gilmore described a main goal of FreeSWAN, for instance, as protecting
by schoen 13y ago
I think that approach was taken by some prior IPsec implementations. I recall that John Gilmore described a main goal of FreeSWAN, for instance, as protecting Internet traffic against passive eavesdropping.
I do wish that plan had worked out. On the other hand,given evidence that governments are sabotaging so much of our communications infrastructure, I guess I fear that active MITM will become common quickly unless there's some mechanism in place to at least detect, publicize, and investigate it.
And since a given IP address can be legitimately used by many different devices, human beings, or organizations in a short timeframe, it's hard to see what this would look like.
- nitrogen 13y agoAnd since a given IP address can be legitimately used by many different devices, human beings, or organizations in a short timeframe, it's hard to see what this would look like. Maybe if we could go back in time, we could add a new field to the Internet Protocol that indicates a unique endpoint ID for IPsec purposes. Two hosts desiring to communicate would exchange endpoint IDs, and an encryption "session" would only apply to the IP+endpoint combination. That way it's still possible to implement UDP and TCP on top of IP, but it doesn't necessarily solve the case when different TCP or UDP ports on a single IP address correspond to a different machine and the port-based router should not be able to decrypt the traffic.