4 ms·

I do think "fixing" TLS is ultimately a pointless exercise that would only serve for the transitional period until we can build an Internet that's encrypted by

by salient 13y ago

I do think "fixing" TLS is ultimately a pointless exercise that would only serve for the transitional period until we can build an Internet that's encrypted by default at the IP or Tranport layer. If that's the case, then we may just have to dump TLS eventually anyway, since it was made as a patchwork to cover a very insecure Internet. We need an Internet where security is mandatory (in a cheap way, if possible), not just "optional".

schoen 13y ago
Right now, I'm not sure we know how to handle key management for universal encryption at the IP layer. With names we can at least claim them, remember historical claims about them, or prove that we apparently control them according to some naming system. With IP addresses we have deliberate churn in control so you might use a different address every week (and someone else might re-use your old address). What is a safe way to associate keys with IP addresses, given this?
- nitrogen 13y ago
  You can use an ephemeral key system to encrypt communications. Knowing who you're talking to, to thwart active MITM, can be regarded as a separate problem from using encryption to thwart passive MITM. We need to solve both problems, but we don't necessarily need to solve them simultaneously.
  - schoen 13y ago
    I think that approach was taken by some prior IPsec implementations. I recall that John Gilmore described a main goal of FreeSWAN, for instance, as protecting Internet traffic against passive eavesdropping. I do wish that plan had worked out. On the other hand,given evidence that governments are sabotaging so much of our communications infrastructure, I guess I fear that active MITM will become common quickly unless there's some mechanism in place to at least detect, publicize, and investigate it. And since a given IP address can be legitimately used by many different devices, human beings, or organizations in a short timeframe, it's hard to see what this would look like.
    - nitrogen 13y ago
      And since a given IP address can be legitimately used by many different devices, human beings, or organizations in a short timeframe, it's hard to see what this would look like. Maybe if we could go back in time, we could add a new field to the Internet Protocol that indicates a unique endpoint ID for IPsec purposes. Two hosts desiring to communicate would exchange endpoint IDs, and an encryption "session" would only apply to the IP+endpoint combination. That way it's still possible to implement UDP and TCP on top of IP, but it doesn't necessarily solve the case when different TCP or UDP ports on a single IP address correspond to a different machine and the port-based router should not be able to decrypt the traffic.

by salient 13y ago

schoen 13y ago

Right now, I'm not sure we know how to handle key management for universal encryption at the IP layer. With names we can at least claim them, remember historical claims about them, or prove that we apparently control them according to some naming system. With IP addresses we have deliberate churn in control so you might use a different address every week (and someone else might re-use your old address). What is a safe way to associate keys with IP addresses, given this?

nitrogen 13y ago
You can use an ephemeral key system to encrypt communications. Knowing who you're talking to, to thwart active MITM, can be regarded as a separate problem from using encryption to thwart passive MITM. We need to solve both problems, but we don't necessarily need to solve them simultaneously.
- schoen 13y ago
  I think that approach was taken by some prior IPsec implementations. I recall that John Gilmore described a main goal of FreeSWAN, for instance, as protecting Internet traffic against passive eavesdropping. I do wish that plan had worked out. On the other hand,given evidence that governments are sabotaging so much of our communications infrastructure, I guess I fear that active MITM will become common quickly unless there's some mechanism in place to at least detect, publicize, and investigate it. And since a given IP address can be legitimately used by many different devices, human beings, or organizations in a short timeframe, it's hard to see what this would look like.
  - nitrogen 13y ago
    And since a given IP address can be legitimately used by many different devices, human beings, or organizations in a short timeframe, it's hard to see what this would look like. Maybe if we could go back in time, we could add a new field to the Internet Protocol that indicates a unique endpoint ID for IPsec purposes. Two hosts desiring to communicate would exchange endpoint IDs, and an encryption "session" would only apply to the IP+endpoint combination. That way it's still possible to implement UDP and TCP on top of IP, but it doesn't necessarily solve the case when different TCP or UDP ports on a single IP address correspond to a different machine and the port-based router should not be able to decrypt the traffic.