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The trouble with the idea that TLS assumes DNS is "totally insecure" is the numerous CAs that will issue certs based on proof of control over the domain name --
by schoen 13y ago
The trouble with the idea that TLS assumes DNS is "totally insecure" is the numerous CAs that will issue certs based on proof of control over the domain name -- as observed by the CA.
So while TLS itself doesn't trust DNS at all, PKIX does! CAs may well have google.com on a blacklist, but if someone could "yank" matasano.com and point it at their own server, they could most likely get GoDaddy to issue them a cert based solely on their control over that server. GoDaddy's existing test for the legitimacy of a certificate issuance request is the ability to post a text file with specified contents on an HTTP server pointed to by the subject CN.
(For that matter, the attacker who took control of the matasano.com zone could then publish MX records allowing them to intercept any verification or confirmation e-mails to the whois contacts.)
- tptacek 13y agoI agree that the model doesn't work at all right now without pinning, though for the adversaries I'm concerned about, it's still strictly better than DNSSEC.
- schoen 13y agoI think I agree with you, given pinning. Without pinning, keys in authenticated DNS (like with DANE) are strictly better than CA certificates, because the CA certificates are themselves issued on the basis of (even unauthenticated!) DNS data.