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>DNSSEC is just another PKI, but this time controlled by world governments. I'm baffled by how anyone could think that DNSSEC is a superior alternative to the C
by pedrocr 13y ago
>DNSSEC is just another PKI, but this time controlled by world governments. I'm baffled by how anyone could think that DNSSEC is a superior alternative to the CA system.
We rely on DNS anyway so what can those world governments do with a DNSSEC PKI that they can't do with DNS as is? I mean if you can change the DNSSEC distributed certificate for google.com surely you can just redirect google.com and be done with it.
- tptacek 13y agoNo. We do not rely on DNS now. The whole design of TLS is premised on the notion that the DNS is insecure. Much to NSA's annoyance, if I switch MAIL.GOOGLE.COM in the DNS, I cannot easily MITM people's Gmail sessions.
- pedrocr 13y ago>Much to NSA's annoyance, if I switch MAIL.GOOGLE.COM in the DNS, I cannot easily MITM people's Gmail sessions. If the user is using a new browser or has an expired HSTS header, wouldn't it actually be trivial to do? Or are you also relying on TACK to say "never connect to mail.google.com without TLS" or on HTTP/2.0 to mandate TLS everywhere?
- tptacek 13y agoIf the whole CA system is compromised, you mean?
- pedrocr 13y agoMy assertion is that absent some way to force TLS from the start on the connection owning DNS allows you to MITM a user that types mail.google.com in the address bar. Where is that wrong?
- tptacek 13y agoChromium will not let you connect to MAIL.GOOGLE.COM via port 80; the fact that Gmail requires TLS is pinned just like their certificate is.
- pedrocr 13y ago>My assertion is that absent some way to force TLS So, my assertion is correct then. Own DNS, own mail.google.com if the browser doesn't force TLS.
- tptacek 13y agoPoint arms up into sky, cast yourself aloft into the heavens, if the earth doesn't have gravity.
- pedrocr 13y agoIf you don't distribute the pin along with the browser you don't get TLS forced on the first connection. As you yourself said in the other thread TLS+TACK doesn't solve this either. So this is hardly a fundamental property of TLS.
- tptacek 13y agoBrowser trust anchors aren't a fundamental property of HTTPS/TLS? That's like saying "TLS is insecure if you don't distribute any root certificates with your browser".
- pedrocr 13y agoReally? You're arguing that a feature that was first implemented in 2011 is a fundamental property of TLS? And are you also arguing that the whole web should have Google/Firefox/IE/Safari ship a certificate pin with the browser? That will surely scale... If we're doing that why do we need CA's at all? Just ship pins of self-signed certificates to all the browsers and trust Google with the integrity of the database.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]