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> At cryptic.io we are creating a client-side, in-browser encryption system Here we go again... Let me guess, these guys also figured out a way to disable the
by IgorPartola 13y ago
> At cryptic.io we are creating a client-side, in-browser encryption system
Here we go again... Let me guess, these guys also figured out a way to disable the context menu from popping up to prevent you from copying anything from their page.
The rest of the article is pretty interesting.
Edit after finishing the last bits of the article: So why is this better than something like MonkeySphere or DNSSEC? Both already let you distribute your public key and don't require anything experimental.
- jstanley 13y agoI haven't read the article, but... This isn't at all comparable to disabling the context menu. Anything that runs client-side and is in opposition to the user is screwed as the user can get around it. An attacker in this case would not have access to the client, an attacker in this case would be a MITM and would therefore not be able to mess with the encryption code (unless the encryption code itself is sent insecurely).
- tptacek 13y agoFor whatever it's worth, DNSSEC is a disaster too.
- pedrocr 13y agoWhy is that? What should we use instead? DNSCurve?
- tptacek 13y agoDNSCurve is fine, but we can also just continue assuming the DNS is insecure and pushing security out to the endpoints, where the End To End Argument says it belongs anyways.
- pedrocr 13y agoSo, how do I connect securely to a new website if I can't trust the DNS response?
- tptacek 13y agoTLS.
- pedrocr 13y agoYou seem to have a clear idea of how TLS+TACK solves this issue but you're not articulating it, just giving laconic answers. As far as I can tell TACK doesn't solve the first connection problem: "The big drawback of the TACK mechanism is that, like other client-side key-pinning methods, it does not protect the user against a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack during the very first connection attempt to the remote server." https://lwn.net/Articles/499134/ https://lwn.net/Articles/499134/ So as far as I can tell even in a TLS+TACK world if your initial connection is to http://mail.mydomain.com http://mail.mydomain.com anyone that controls the DNS has you and if you connect to https://mail.mydomain.com https://mail.mydomain.com it's anyone that controls a rogue CA. This is exactly the same situation of TLS without TACK, no?
- tptacek 13y agoTLS+TACK doesn't solve the first connection problem if you stipulate a corrupted CA PKI. But the difference between the CA PKI and the DNSSEC PKI is that you have to stipulate that the CAs are corrupt; the DNSSEC PKI is corrupt by design. Meanwhile: the CAs are financially disincentivized from going rogue, because Mozilla and Google will remove them from the trust store if they do stupid things. What dynamic pinning plus CAs buys you, on top of key continuity that corrupted CAs can't break, is surveillance: an entity that can get bogus certificates issued can't assume they can do it undetected, because those certs will almost immediately break on someone's pin.
- pedrocr 13y ago>TLS+TACK doesn't solve the first connection problem if you stipulate a corrupted CA PKI. Don't you think it's a reasonable assumption that the NSA controls at least one CA? >the DNSSEC PKI is corrupt by design. That's interesting, have any pointers as to why? With the current model any CA can vouch for any site (hence the need for pinning), with DNSSEC only the CA that controls .COM can issue fake certificates for EXAMPLE.COM. I don't understand how that doesn't make the potential attacks strictly less. >What dynamic pinning plus CAs buys you, on top of key continuity that corrupted CAs can't break, is surveillance: an entity that can get bogus certificates issued can't assume they can do it undetected, because those certs will almost immediately break on someone's pin. Right, and that's fine for mass attacks (which is important) and less than stellar for anything that's targeted. Plus there's nothing stopping you from implementing pinning+DNSSEC CA's, so that if the .COM CA starts issuing fake GOOGLE.COM certificates you catch him. At the same time RandomCAFromAntartica doesn't even get to try.
- timmclean 13y agoFrom their Kickstarter page[1]: > [the browser code] can also be verified against an open source repo with a browser extension [1]: http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/cryptic-io/cryptic-encrypted-online-storage http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/cryptic-io/cryptic-encry...