There aren't really any good definitions of consciousness that are easily falsifiable. It's in the nature of the problem. All of our collected data about other

There aren't really any good definitions of consciousness that are easily falsifiable. It's in the nature of the problem. All of our collected data about other people's/organism's consciousness is third-person, while consciousness is definitely a first-person phenomenon. I don't know for sure that anyone else is conscious; the world could be populated by zombies (in the philosophical sense) for all I know. Anyway, the root of the word "science" comes from "knowledge", not falsifiability. These are still very early days for brain science and consciousness is its hardest problem. Integrated information theory (IIT) in particular, does offer some falsifiable predictions, btw. IIT's phi metric requires both interconnectedness, but also heterogeneity. E.g., Koch alluded to the cerebellum. The cerebellum has half of the neurons in the brain, but they are arranged in a simple, almost crystal-like pattern. People who have had cerebellums removed due to cancer show no alterations in consciousness. If we were to find someone who had their cerebellum removed and it did impact their consciousness, IIT would be incorrect. Likewise, IIT fits with data about the lack of consciousness during slow wave sleep and generalized seizures (simple, rhythmic firing patterns), but again, if we were able to find counterexamples, it would be disproved.