4 ms·

Well, what are the risks off exposing your data to the NSA? This seems to be assumed to be this terrible thing, making it worth it to undertake expensive and an

by b1daly 13y ago

Well, what are the risks off exposing your data to the NSA? This seems to be assumed to be this terrible thing, making it worth it to undertake expensive and annoying measures to avoid it. Do you really think this is going to be worth it to anybody? What is the story by which a specific calamity befalls someone whose data is caught in the NSA dragnet? As others have pointed out, the NSA can spy at will everywhere else in the world. Nevermind that Germanies spies are probably in on the scheme. The risk from private bad actors on the internet is much higher.

workhere-io 13y ago
Industrial espionage is a very real thing with very real risks for larger companies. Here is one example of how NSA could use (and may have used) the data they're collecting to help American economic interests: http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/04383424450/latest-leak-shows-nsa-engaging-economic-espionage-not-fighting-terrorism.shtml http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/04383424450/latest...
bigiain 13y ago
From examples I've read about and noticed over the last 5 or 6 months - things like "parallel reconstruction" leading to non-intelligence services targeting people for drug offences, things like journalists being bailed up at customs by DHS staff with printouts of personal email, things like the Perobas (the Brazilian oil company) revelations/suspicions. And _most_ obviously, the Snowden leaks themselves. Snowden leaked everything he did publicly at _great_ personal cost – is it even _vaguely_ plausible that others in similar positions to him haven't abused the NSA data collection for much-better-hidden personal gain? If I could have been snooping on all incoming and outgoing YCombinator email over the last 5 or 10 years, how many "lucky" investments do you suppose I could have made? Even if I agreed that it was appropriate/acceptable for trusted NSA staff to have access to all global email/phonecalls/whatever - it's _obvious_ they don't have adequate protection in place to prevent mis-use. When they've got cutesy nicknames like "LOVEINT" for things that are obviously so common, yet are (or should be) criminal abuse of positions/power – how could anyone accept "the NSA dragnet"? I understand "national security" is important. I understand "stopping terrorists" is needed. I also think if the US government, people, and businesses think "the rest of the world" will just sadly watch on as they allow the NSA to continue doing what they are doing, they are mistaken - and the blowback will be _astoundingly_ counter-productive for the NSA's _important_ goals. When it becomes clear that we need (and can create) things like strong crypto with easily useable software, TOR-like anonymising techniques (but not, of course, your US government designed and probably exploited TOR), encryption where we trust both the math and the implementation (and by "trust" I mean trust mathematicians and software crypto experts from non-US backgrounds, and preferably from conflicting backgrounds as well - I'd take software/crypto advice agreed to by a majority of Russian & Indian & Brazilian & Equadorian & Chinese experts over conficting advice from Schnier or Zimmermann or and US or Five Eyes affiliated person/business) – we will. And when "the next level" of "secure against the NSA" communication tools become available and widespread - and widely made available to politicians, businesses, journalists, and regular citizens - guess who _else_ will have it? And how will the NSA conduct their "war on terror" then? (and their less acknowledged but very real "war on drugs" and "war on non-US companies profits" and "war on journalists critical of US policy" and "war on US citizens demanding their government be held accountable"?)
- b1daly 13y ago
  That is an interesting observation of blowback from NSA overreach (stronger crypto enabling bonafide bad actors to escape detection). I appreciate the response, as I feel like many people post here with sort of an implicit perspective that it is obvious that pervasive NSA spying is a catastrophe. I still maintain that all of the issues you've outlined are not going to considered that bad by your average citizen. Especially in comparison to the pain and cost of duplicating Google's type of services on a personal or organizational level. So what is interesting to me is that, if you grant my premise that your average civilian is not going to be that upset by this, so many tech types have such an opposite response. While it may be more doable for a techy to set up secure web services, it still strikes me as an outlandish use of resources given that the vast majority of them truly don't have anything to fear from the NSA. Figures like Snowden are a special case, as are anti authoritarian crypto activists, as the intelligence community obviously sees them as a threat. My thinking generally is that there is no way to stop the NSA and similar agencies from spying like crazy. So if we all just assume that all of our electronic communications are non private, it simplifies the issue. (Considering the internet as public space). So to have secure computing, you simply can't hook your computer to the internet. What is more disturbing to me than the spying is the ridiculous over use of secrecy and classification, which I think breeds far more opportunities for abuse. For pulling the curtain back on this, Snowden is a hero.
bigiain 13y ago
From examples I've read about and noticed over the last 5 or 6 months - things like "parallel reconstruction" leading to non-intelligence services targeting people for drug offences, things like journalists being bailed up at customs by DHS staff with printouts of personal email, things like the Perobas (the Brazilian oil company) revelations/suspicions. And _most_ obviously, the Snowden leaks themselves. Snowden leaked everything he did publicly at _great_ personal cost – is it even _vaguely_ plausible that others in similar positions to him haven't abused the NSA data collection for much-better-hidden personal gain? If I could have been snooping on all incoming and outgoing YCombinator email over the last 5 or 10 years, how many "lucky" investments do you suppose I could have made? Even if I agreed that it was appropriate/acceptable for trusted NSA staff to have access to all global email/phonecalls/whatever - it's _obvious_ they don't have adequate protection in place to prevent mis-use. When they've got cutesy nicknames like "LOVEINT" for things that are obviously so common, yet are (or should be) criminal abuse of positions/power – how could anyone accept "the NSA dragnet"? I understand "national security" is important. I understand "stopping terrorists" is needed. I also think if the US government, people, and businesses think "the rest of the world" will just sadly watch on as they allow the NSA to continue doing what they are doing, they are mistaken - and the blowback will be _astoundingly_ counter-productive for the NSA's _important_ goals. When it becomes clear that things like strong crypto with easily useable software, TOR-like anonymising techniques (but not, of course, your US government designed and probably exploited TOR), encryption where we trust both the math and the implementation (and by "trust" I mean trust mathematicians and software crypto experts from non-US backgrounds, and preferably from conflicting backgrounds as well - I'd take software/crypto advice agreed to by a majority of Russian & Indian & Brazilian & Equadorian & Chinese experts over conficting advice from Schnier or Zimmermann or and US or Five Eyes affiliated person/business. And when "the next level" of "secure against the NSA" communication tools become available and widespread - and widely made available to politicians, businesses, journalists, and regular citizens - guess who _else_ will have it? And how will the NSA conduct their "war on terror" then? (and their less acknowledged but very real "war on drugs" and "war on non-US companies profits" and "war on journalists critical of US policy" and "war on US citizens demanding their government be held accountable"?)

by b1daly 13y ago

workhere-io 13y ago

Industrial espionage is a very real thing with very real risks for larger companies. Here is one example of how NSA could use (and may have used) the data they're collecting to help American economic interests: http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/04383424450/latest-leak-shows-nsa-engaging-economic-espionage-not-fighting-terrorism.shtml http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/04383424450/latest...

bigiain 13y ago

From examples I've read about and noticed over the last 5 or 6 months - things like "parallel reconstruction" leading to non-intelligence services targeting people for drug offences, things like journalists being bailed up at customs by DHS staff with printouts of personal email, things like the Perobas (the Brazilian oil company) revelations/suspicions. And _most_ obviously, the Snowden leaks themselves. Snowden leaked everything he did publicly at _great_ personal cost – is it even _vaguely_ plausible that others in similar positions to him haven't abused the NSA data collection for much-better-hidden personal gain? If I could have been snooping on all incoming and outgoing YCombinator email over the last 5 or 10 years, how many "lucky" investments do you suppose I could have made? Even if I agreed that it was appropriate/acceptable for trusted NSA staff to have access to all global email/phonecalls/whatever - it's _obvious_ they don't have adequate protection in place to prevent mis-use. When they've got cutesy nicknames like "LOVEINT" for things that are obviously so common, yet are (or should be) criminal abuse of positions/power – how could anyone accept "the NSA dragnet"? I understand "national security" is important. I understand "stopping terrorists" is needed. I also think if the US government, people, and businesses think "the rest of the world" will just sadly watch on as they allow the NSA to continue doing what they are doing, they are mistaken - and the blowback will be _astoundingly_ counter-productive for the NSA's _important_ goals. When it becomes clear that we need (and can create) things like strong crypto with easily useable software, TOR-like anonymising techniques (but not, of course, your US government designed and probably exploited TOR), encryption where we trust both the math and the implementation (and by "trust" I mean trust mathematicians and software crypto experts from non-US backgrounds, and preferably from conflicting backgrounds as well - I'd take software/crypto advice agreed to by a majority of Russian & Indian & Brazilian & Equadorian & Chinese experts over conficting advice from Schnier or Zimmermann or and US or Five Eyes affiliated person/business) – we will. And when "the next level" of "secure against the NSA" communication tools become available and widespread - and widely made available to politicians, businesses, journalists, and regular citizens - guess who _else_ will have it? And how will the NSA conduct their "war on terror" then? (and their less acknowledged but very real "war on drugs" and "war on non-US companies profits" and "war on journalists critical of US policy" and "war on US citizens demanding their government be held accountable"?)

b1daly 13y ago
That is an interesting observation of blowback from NSA overreach (stronger crypto enabling bonafide bad actors to escape detection). I appreciate the response, as I feel like many people post here with sort of an implicit perspective that it is obvious that pervasive NSA spying is a catastrophe. I still maintain that all of the issues you've outlined are not going to considered that bad by your average citizen. Especially in comparison to the pain and cost of duplicating Google's type of services on a personal or organizational level. So what is interesting to me is that, if you grant my premise that your average civilian is not going to be that upset by this, so many tech types have such an opposite response. While it may be more doable for a techy to set up secure web services, it still strikes me as an outlandish use of resources given that the vast majority of them truly don't have anything to fear from the NSA. Figures like Snowden are a special case, as are anti authoritarian crypto activists, as the intelligence community obviously sees them as a threat. My thinking generally is that there is no way to stop the NSA and similar agencies from spying like crazy. So if we all just assume that all of our electronic communications are non private, it simplifies the issue. (Considering the internet as public space). So to have secure computing, you simply can't hook your computer to the internet. What is more disturbing to me than the spying is the ridiculous over use of secrecy and classification, which I think breeds far more opportunities for abuse. For pulling the curtain back on this, Snowden is a hero.

bigiain 13y ago

From examples I've read about and noticed over the last 5 or 6 months - things like "parallel reconstruction" leading to non-intelligence services targeting people for drug offences, things like journalists being bailed up at customs by DHS staff with printouts of personal email, things like the Perobas (the Brazilian oil company) revelations/suspicions. And _most_ obviously, the Snowden leaks themselves. Snowden leaked everything he did publicly at _great_ personal cost – is it even _vaguely_ plausible that others in similar positions to him haven't abused the NSA data collection for much-better-hidden personal gain? If I could have been snooping on all incoming and outgoing YCombinator email over the last 5 or 10 years, how many "lucky" investments do you suppose I could have made? Even if I agreed that it was appropriate/acceptable for trusted NSA staff to have access to all global email/phonecalls/whatever - it's _obvious_ they don't have adequate protection in place to prevent mis-use. When they've got cutesy nicknames like "LOVEINT" for things that are obviously so common, yet are (or should be) criminal abuse of positions/power – how could anyone accept "the NSA dragnet"? I understand "national security" is important. I understand "stopping terrorists" is needed. I also think if the US government, people, and businesses think "the rest of the world" will just sadly watch on as they allow the NSA to continue doing what they are doing, they are mistaken - and the blowback will be _astoundingly_ counter-productive for the NSA's _important_ goals. When it becomes clear that things like strong crypto with easily useable software, TOR-like anonymising techniques (but not, of course, your US government designed and probably exploited TOR), encryption where we trust both the math and the implementation (and by "trust" I mean trust mathematicians and software crypto experts from non-US backgrounds, and preferably from conflicting backgrounds as well - I'd take software/crypto advice agreed to by a majority of Russian & Indian & Brazilian & Equadorian & Chinese experts over conficting advice from Schnier or Zimmermann or and US or Five Eyes affiliated person/business. And when "the next level" of "secure against the NSA" communication tools become available and widespread - and widely made available to politicians, businesses, journalists, and regular citizens - guess who _else_ will have it? And how will the NSA conduct their "war on terror" then? (and their less acknowledged but very real "war on drugs" and "war on non-US companies profits" and "war on journalists critical of US policy" and "war on US citizens demanding their government be held accountable"?)