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I can point out HMAC vulnerabilities. Nate's Google Keyczar finding. Funny you mention that. The flaw Nate pointed out in Google keyczar can also affect CCM o
by cperciva 17y ago
I can point out HMAC vulnerabilities. Nate's Google Keyczar finding.
Funny you mention that. The flaw Nate pointed out in Google keyczar can also affect CCM or EAX (or, for that matter, any authenticated encryption method).
It should be at least as easy for you to give me two published implementation flaws in a CCM or EAX implementation. Go.
Sure:
http://people.csail.mit.edu/tromer/papers/cache.pdf http://people.csail.mit.edu/tromer/papers/cache.pdf
http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf
Of course, neither of these two papers mention CCM or EAX -- but the flaws they mention apply to both CCM and EAX (because an attacker can cause you to input a block of his choice to your AES core) while not affecting CTR-then-HMAC.
- tptacek 17y agoFirst, the flaw in Keyczar didn't affect CCM (or CBC-MAC) or EAX (or OMAC). Second, I cited SSH, SNMPv3, and Keyczar. You responded with localhost cache timing of AES and remote cache timing of naked AES. There's an obvious difference between the two sets: one consists of real attacks, the other of speculative attacks. If your point is valid, it shouldn't be hard for you to name one system in which CCM or EAX were "broken" --- and I'll give you any definition of broken you choose --- because of these papers. They're both great papers. But I don't think they make the argument you think they do.
- cperciva 17y agoFirst, the flaw in Keyczar didn't affect CCM (or CBC-MAC) or EAX (or OMAC). Of course not -- keyczar doesn't implement CCM or EAX. But the fact that CCM and EAX are obscure shouldn't count as a point in their favour. There's an obvious difference between the two sets: one consists of real attacks, the other of speculative attacks. The Bernstein and Oskiv-Shamir-Tromer attacks were not at all speculative. They showed the concrete theft of a key. If your point is valid, it shouldn't be hard for you to name one system in which CCM or EAX were "broken" --- and I'll give you any definition of broken you choose --- because of these papers. I don't know of any systems which use CCM or EAX in software on general-purpose hardware -- but if you name me a system which uses OpenSSL's AES code circa early 2005 in EAX mode, I'll name you a system which was vulnerable to a timing side channel.
- tptacek 17y agohttp://www.google.com/codesearch?q=CCM+AES&hl=en&btnG=Search+Code http://www.google.com/codesearch?q=CCM+AES&hl=en&btn... Tally ho, Colin! Looking forward to what you find; I'm sure I'll learn something. If Bernstein's attack was really that relevant to real-world cryptosystems, I'm sure you'll come back with something fun.