3 ms·
> See how SSH fingerprinting works. It doesn't, as a MITM prevention technique, for a gullible population. It doesn't even work for non-gullible population th
by VLM 13y ago
> See how SSH fingerprinting works.
It doesn't, as a MITM prevention technique, for a gullible population. It doesn't even work for non-gullible population that's been trained to always hit "Y" on first connection from a host to a new server... err... I mean first connection to a MITM who then talks to the new server for you.
There are ways to make the situation slightly harder like the extremely unpopular idea of putting SSH host keys in DNS and then securing DNS ... err .. probably securing DNS via a CA type backend.... Well even unsecured DNS holding SSH host keys is better than nothing, or at least it makes people more susceptible because they feel safer, or something like that.
- mikeash 13y agoThe odds of encountering a MITM attack on your first connection to a new server are low. If it does happen, then the attacker will have to keep doing it forever, or else you'll get a warning the moment you manage to connect directly to the site without the MITM. If your first connection is direct, then you're safe from MITM forever. If your first connection is compromised, then at least you'll likely discover that fact quickly. I think this qualifies as "works".
- schrodinger 13y agoI think the point is that most users wouldn't notice having to press "Y" again to accept a new fingerprint.
- mikeash 13y agossh only gives you the "y/n" choice the first time you connect. If you've connected before but the key has changed, it throws up a very nasty warning and does not even give you the choice to continue. You have to manually edit your key file to remove the offending entry if you want to start using the new key.
- abstractConcept 13y agoThis seems similar to the logic behind TOR entry guards: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards