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I'm sitting here still trying to think of a way to prevent MITM attacks if you have no idea who the guy is on the other side... Maybe I need to drink more tea
by VLM 13y ago
I'm sitting here still trying to think of a way to prevent MITM attacks if you have no idea who the guy is on the other side... Maybe I need to drink more tea this early in the morning?
I guess if you did something weird like flip the protocol upside down such that all people would have "internet licenses" and enter them into the browser they're using at that moment (or better yet, lets charge each user $50/yr PER BROWSER LICENSE) and it became the sites problem to encrypt to the end users key... One way or another I think you have to verify the identity of at least one side WRT MITM?
- hcarvalhoalves 13y ago> I'm sitting here still trying to think of a way to prevent MITM attacks if you have no idea who the guy is on the other side... Maybe I need to drink more tea this early in the morning? It's not that you don't know who the guy is, you just don't rely on a 3rd party to tell you that. See how SSH fingerprinting works.
- ams6110 13y agoSSH keys work exactly like self-signed certificates. On first connection you get the "whoah, this isn't trusted, do you want to proceed" warning, and if you accept, you are not warned in the future unless the key changes. If browsers would make it easier to "permanently accept" a self-signed certificate (right now it's usually a multi-step process with blood-red warning messages at every step) we'd have the same situation as SSH keys.
- peterwwillis 13y agoHTTPS involves multiple servers that are interchanged regularly and commonly use different keys. The keys change regularly. There'd be no way to know if the key changing is part of regular operation or a man in the middle.
- bnr 13y agoNote that there's a difference between SSH fingerprints and (self-signed) SSL certificates. Multiple servers can easily share a certificate.
- peterwwillis 13y agoIt would be unwise to do so. In any case, phasing out old servers and certs for new ones is common practice. Using one cert everywhere (which would mean using one set of keys everywhere, which is a horrible idea) would require more downtime for maintenance of the certificates. It's not gonna happen.
- VLM 13y ago> See how SSH fingerprinting works. It doesn't, as a MITM prevention technique, for a gullible population. It doesn't even work for non-gullible population that's been trained to always hit "Y" on first connection from a host to a new server... err... I mean first connection to a MITM who then talks to the new server for you. There are ways to make the situation slightly harder like the extremely unpopular idea of putting SSH host keys in DNS and then securing DNS ... err .. probably securing DNS via a CA type backend.... Well even unsecured DNS holding SSH host keys is better than nothing, or at least it makes people more susceptible because they feel safer, or something like that.
- mikeash 13y agoThe odds of encountering a MITM attack on your first connection to a new server are low. If it does happen, then the attacker will have to keep doing it forever, or else you'll get a warning the moment you manage to connect directly to the site without the MITM. If your first connection is direct, then you're safe from MITM forever. If your first connection is compromised, then at least you'll likely discover that fact quickly. I think this qualifies as "works".
- schrodinger 13y agoI think the point is that most users wouldn't notice having to press "Y" again to accept a new fingerprint.
- mikeash 13y agossh only gives you the "y/n" choice the first time you connect. If you've connected before but the key has changed, it throws up a very nasty warning and does not even give you the choice to continue. You have to manually edit your key file to remove the offending entry if you want to start using the new key.
- abstractConcept 13y agoThis seems similar to the logic behind TOR entry guards: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards
- peeters 13y agoSo you don't prevent MITM attacks...it's still a step up from cleartext. All this change is meant to ensure is that all HTTP/2.0 traffic is encrypted, not that it is all authenticated. For authenticated communication, we continue to have what HTTPS is today. The main issue is retraining people to not think that "https" means "safe". That's something that browsers are already good at, however, because there is already a world of difference between the user experiences of visiting a site with a trusted cert and visiting a site with an untrusted cert.
- tptacek 13y agoIt's not a meaningful step up from cleartext, because a passive attacker can become an active attacker with just a couple spoofed packets or control of a single DNS resolver.
- ars 13y agoThat's still a step up. Now you need to be an active attacker, and not just a passive one. The perfect is the enemy of the better.
- bct 13y agoThe worse is the enemy of the better too.
- ars 13y agoIt's easy to decide to avoid the worse. But deciding on the tradeoff for the better vs the perfect is much harder.
- tptacek 13y agoThis tradeoff is easy. UI that makes unauthenticated connections easier to accept is a bad idea; UI that makes certificate pinning work better is a good idea. Suggested tradeoff: pursue good idea, avoid bad idea.
- danielweber 13y agoThe "guy on the other side" is the fridge you bought at the store and just installed in your house. You want to connect to it securely, but the fridge really has no way to prove to you who it is through any kind of third-channel. Hell, forget about fridges. It's the router you just got at Best Buy.
- jasonwatkinspdx 13y agoA fence doesn't stop someone with a ladder, but that doesn't mean fences are a bad idea.