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Isowall: Mini-firewall that completely isolates a device from the local network
- danielrhodes 13y agoHow about unplugging the Ethernet cable?
- untothebreach 13y agoDid you read about what this actually does?
- TallGuyShort 13y agoI dislike comments like this because you're not actually making a point. For all you know the parent did read the article. I did too - and I still took a minute to not have the same concern as the parent. If you read the article, why don't you enlighten everyone else reading your comment?
- mvikramaditya 13y agoParaphrasing from the article, this tool allows the machine to have internet access while being isolated from the local network.
- AsymetricCom 13y agoThis should be enforced at the switch level.
- hack_edu 13y agoSometimes Ops takes 48 hours to resolve tickets.
- TallGuyShort 13y agoMy first thought was similar - because I was picturing actively self-replicating malware, and you're right - if you don't want that on your own network you shouldn't be opening up everyone else's network to it. But I think the point is just to open up pockets inside your trusted network for less-trusted machines. It's not that you think they have viruses, it's that you just don't want them to have access to the rest of your internals. Most places have an entirely separate network for guests, but if this was reliable and robust enough, maybe it would be a nice alternative.
- fsckin 13y agoIf you're investigating a botnet (how it spreads, CnC operations), this would be a nice tool to have.
- randywaterhouse 13y agoEasy to configure, simple functionality, niche-use. I think it's a pretty cool idea, and definitely might come to use it if I ever get a machine in-house infected with something interesting and I want to just toy with it (/ keep an eye on what it's doing). I'm sure this would be useful for security professionals dealing with all kinds of network-required infections (or not, as all the "BadBIOS" talk suggests). Pretty cool stuff, I'm wondering if one could simply set this up with a set of iptables rules (on a Linux router, i.e. DD-WRT). Just drop all packets that aren't destined to the open internet, and even control which ports the isolated machine has access to (i.e. cut off port 80 and see if the infection/process tries to reach out on port xyz or something else).
- noonespecial 13y agoJust using iptables would be easier but has the disadvantage that the quarantined box "knows you're there" and could attack or behave differently. The advantage of this solution is that the firewall is almost (but not quite) fully transparent.
- clarry 13y agoInteresting.. is this a joke? LOG(0, " [hint] need to sudo or run as root or something\n"); LOG(0, " [hint] I've got some local priv escalation " "0days that might work\n"); EDIT: I shall forget I ever looked in the code. There's no LICENSE file, but there's this... /* Copyright: (c) 2009-2010 by Robert David Graham ** License: This code is private to the author, and you do not ** have a license to run it, or own a copy, unless given ** a license personally by the author. This is ** explained in the LICENSE file at the root of the project. **/
- kylemaxwell 13y agoThis is the difference between "open source" and "disclosed source".
- kylemaxwell 13y agoFWIW, I just talked to the author (Robert Graham) about it, and he responded: "bah, I need to fix that" https://twitter.com/ErrataRob/status/399979105854058497 https://twitter.com/ErrataRob/status/399979105854058497 EDIT: And he pushed a LICENSE file just now. "I provide this code with no warrantee whatsoever. But hey, if you want to take the risk and run it, go for it."
- robertgraham 13y agoI think that's FOSS compatible.
- clarry 13y agoI wonder what you mean by FOSS compatible? Copyright by default is rather restrictive; to make something free, you must explicitly grant these freedoms. A warranty disclaimer does not grant people the freedom to copy, modify, sell, redistribute, etc.
- peterwwillis 13y agoSo this is a software DMZ? I haven't done this before, but it should be doable in netfilter or routing tables without an ip stack on the interface. I should also add that choosing to rely on new, custom code for a specific purpose like this is much more dangerous than relying on the decades-old Linux netfilter and ip stack. One netfilter rule would prevent a DMZ'd host from fucking with the transparent firewall. http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//netfilter-extensions-HOWTO-4.html#ss4.5 http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//netfilter-exte... http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//netfilter-extensions-HOWTO-4.html#ss4.4 http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//netfilter-exte... http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/linux-advanced-routing-tutorial?page=0,3 http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/linux-advanced-routing-t...
- j_s 13y agothe infected targetted cannot touch the firewall machine in any way, except as allowed within the is_allowed() function The security guarantee is derived from the minimal attack surface of this is_allowed() method, but fails to consider the dependency on libpcap!