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After reading the amendment, my take on it is that the EFF article is stating that the whole program needs to be scrapped and criticizing Feinstein for not doin

After reading the amendment, my take on it is that the EFF article is stating that the whole program needs to be scrapped and criticizing Feinstein for not doing so. Feinstein is apparently of the opinion that the program could be useful and her tactic is instead to put additional oversight in place. Here is what this bill does specify: - Codifies that no message content may be collected under this authority - Specifies that any queries against this data must have documentation showing "reasonable articulable suspicion that the selector is associated with international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof" (note that military/political/counter-espionage/etc. is not listed) - A person meeting the above criteria who travels into the US may continue to be targeted for up to 72 hours. The Attorney General may grant an extension as an "emergency authorization". - A record is to be made for each search against the database of the phone number searched for, the person who searched for it, date and time it occurred and documentation as to why the search was performed. - The documentation for each search must be given to the FISC. The FISC is explicitly granted the ability to terminate any collection if it finds that the search was unlawful. - Directs the FISC to appoint additional personnel with access to classified information and expertise in "privacy and civil liberties, intelligence collection, telecommunications, or any other area that may lend legal or technical expertise to the court." An annual report must be submitted to Congress on the number of personnel appointed. - Any individual who circumvents access to the phone records database will be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years. - A semiannual report needs to be made to the House and Senate Intelligence Subcommittees with information on all electronic surveillance, physical searches and use of pen registers/trap and trace devices conducted under this act. The report needs to include the total number of requests made to the court, how many were approved/denied/modified, the names of any targets within the United States, compliance incidents, any emergency authorizations, etc. That information, along with any of the documentation mentioned above must be made available on request to the NSA Inspector General, the Intelligence Community Inspector General, DoJ and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board - An unclassified summary of all of the above information needs to be made available to each member of Congress.

mtgx 13y ago
> The documentation for each search must be given to the FISC. The FISC is explicitly granted the ability to terminate any collection if it finds that the search was unlawful. I thought they were already supposed to do that, and the reason they had a "Court" of judges in the first place. Why would I believe anything will change with regarding that Court, once this bill is passed? Also, as Bruce Schneier says, "metadata is surveillance": https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/metadata_equals.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/metadata_equa... They assassinate people with signature strikes based on metadata, so don't say "metadata isn't important". It's deadly so. The solution isn't to allow them to only collect metadata (only in US, seems they will keep collecting everything on "foreigners"), it's to end "mass surveillance", whichever way it's done. Surveillance should only ever be targeted. As whistleblower and former NSA William Binney said recently, NSA used to do that - they didn't always do mass surveillance on every country's individuals. And finally, Feinstein just can't be trusted. For all we know that bill was written by NSA itself, knowing full well how they could "interpret" some of the stuff in the bill.
nickff 13y ago
Executive branch oversight of government programs has never been effective in protecting the citizenry from harm in the past, and there is no reason to believe this 'effort' would be any different.
socillion 13y ago
> - Specifies that any queries against this data must have documentation showing "reasonable articulable suspicion that the selector is associated with international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof" (note that military/political/counter-espionage/etc. is not listed) This language only modifies FISA section 501, which pertains to bulk collection of business records (i.e. Verizon phone call data), and not 702 [1]. The amendment adds language explicitly allowing searching of US communications under 702, despite the section being titled "[p]rocedures for targeting certain persons outside the United States other than United States persons" and starting with "limitations: may not intentionally target a United States person". Although 702 has been used to target US citizens [2], the law doesn't reflect this usage -- yet. Here is the addition [3]: > A query of the contents of communications acquired under this section with a selector known to be used by a United States person may be conducted by ... the Intelligence Community only if the purpose of the query is to obtain foreign intelligence information or information necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance. And the loophole (a 2nd one is omitted here): > Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of a law enforcement agency to conduct a query for law enforcement purposes of the contents of communications acquired under this section. This is the only part of the amendment that I read, and it looks a lot like swiss cheese already. 1. Section 702: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a 2. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-wa... 3. Section 6 of the amendment.

mtgx 13y ago

> The documentation for each search must be given to the FISC. The FISC is explicitly granted the ability to terminate any collection if it finds that the search was unlawful. I thought they were already supposed to do that, and the reason they had a "Court" of judges in the first place. Why would I believe anything will change with regarding that Court, once this bill is passed? Also, as Bruce Schneier says, "metadata is surveillance": https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/metadata_equals.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/metadata_equa... They assassinate people with signature strikes based on metadata, so don't say "metadata isn't important". It's deadly so. The solution isn't to allow them to only collect metadata (only in US, seems they will keep collecting everything on "foreigners"), it's to end "mass surveillance", whichever way it's done. Surveillance should only ever be targeted. As whistleblower and former NSA William Binney said recently, NSA used to do that - they didn't always do mass surveillance on every country's individuals. And finally, Feinstein just can't be trusted. For all we know that bill was written by NSA itself, knowing full well how they could "interpret" some of the stuff in the bill.

nickff 13y ago

Executive branch oversight of government programs has never been effective in protecting the citizenry from harm in the past, and there is no reason to believe this 'effort' would be any different.

socillion 13y ago

> - Specifies that any queries against this data must have documentation showing "reasonable articulable suspicion that the selector is associated with international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof" (note that military/political/counter-espionage/etc. is not listed) This language only modifies FISA section 501, which pertains to bulk collection of business records (i.e. Verizon phone call data), and not 702 [1]. The amendment adds language explicitly allowing searching of US communications under 702, despite the section being titled "[p]rocedures for targeting certain persons outside the United States other than United States persons" and starting with "limitations: may not intentionally target a United States person". Although 702 has been used to target US citizens [2], the law doesn't reflect this usage -- yet. Here is the addition [3]: > A query of the contents of communications acquired under this section with a selector known to be used by a United States person may be conducted by ... the Intelligence Community only if the purpose of the query is to obtain foreign intelligence information or information necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance. And the loophole (a 2nd one is omitted here): > Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of a law enforcement agency to conduct a query for law enforcement purposes of the contents of communications acquired under this section. This is the only part of the amendment that I read, and it looks a lot like swiss cheese already. 1. Section 702: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a 2. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-wa... 3. Section 6 of the amendment.